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ABSTRACT 
.... _, 
This thesis examines the influence of pol~tical factors, 
' ' e_ 
upon the deterinination of regulatory policy under conditions 
of scientific uncertainty. The regulation of occupational 
. ' 
exposure to toxic substances by the Occupational Safety\and 
l, 
Health Administration (OSHA) provides 'an example of'this type 
of policy. A discussion of the history _of occupational heal th 
policy and the regulatory framework for occupational exposure 
to toxic substaqces serves as the basis for a review of OSHA' s 
regulation of formaldehyde. 
The thesis concludes that regulatory policy dealing with 
scientific uncertainty should take ·subjective, political 
factors into ac,.count. However, certain ele,ments of the pol i9y 
process can take these factors into account more legitimately 
than others. An examination of the roles of Congress, the 
judiciary, and the bureaucracy in the regulation of 
occupational exposure to toxic substances demonstrates that 
the bureaucracy remains the apprqpriate . arena in which .to' 
resolve the problem of __ ~ci~ntific uncertainty. Nevertheless, 
the thesis proposes several recommendations to improve OSHA·' s 
" 
. 
. 
regulation of toxic substances •. 
,. . 
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INTRODUCTION 
.. 
For we must admit that the workers in 
certain arts and crafts sometimes derive 
from them grave injuries, so that where 
they hoped for a subsistence that would 
prolong their lives and f~ed their 
families, they are too often repaid.with 
the most·dangerous diseases and finally, 
uttering curses on the profession to 
..... 
which they had devoted themselves, they · 
desert their post amohg the living. 1 · , 
Bernardino Ramazzini 
Early Hi~tory of Occupational Saf~ty and Health 
• 
If a researcher surveyed Americans about their knowledge 
". 
of safety and health in the workplace, many of their responses 
would include some reference to the Occupational Saf~ty and ~ 
Health Administration (OSHA). Advances in medicine and 
technology, .. as well as the controversy which has surrounded 
. 
OSHA since its inception, have ensured that occupational 
ill 
safety and health issues have consistently received more 
attention during the era of OSHA than any other .period of 
history. 
diverse 
. Ho:wever-, ~ authors writing from perspe9tives as· 
as medicine and . . _;,. literature ,have\ . id~ntified 
1 Bernardino· Ramazzini, De. Morbis · · A.rtificum Diatriba,_, 
1713 ed., trans. Wilmer Cave Wright (Chicago: University of· 
Chicago Press, 1940), P·. 7. 
2· 
I • 
f 
( 
\ 
I . ~ 
occupational safety and heal th concerns th·roughout the 
development of Western civilization. 2 Furthermore, the issues 
which have been important historically often parallel many 
pontemporary occupational safety and health matters. Thus, 
I I If • I '\'-
a discussion of occupational safety. and heal th throughout 
Western ·development · provides a foundation·. upon which the 
reader can build his knowledge of the American experience. 
For example, the letters of Pliny the Younger, the Roman 
author and statesman, demonstrate the relevance of early 
Western ideas concerning occupational safety and health to 
contemporary issue~. His reference to occupati·onal lead 
poi~oning_ is frequently. cited in discussions of early 
• . 
. 
industrial hygiene. 3 In modern occupational health, exposure 
to lead has consistently been a controversial topic. 
Written during the Protestant Reformation, De Re 
Metallica, a comprehensive study of mining by the German 
scholar Georgius Agricola, includes some discussion of the 
occupational safety and heal th concerns of miners. While this 
work examines all aspects of mining, Agricola had a special 
interest in safety and health issues because he was a 
• 
.. 
2 In "A Law Is Made--The Legislative Process in the 
Occupational Safety and Heal th Act of 1970," Labor Law Journal 
25 (1974), Benjamin. L. Brown states that there , is a long 
history of interest in occup~tional safety-and health problems 
(p. 596). His brief historical account served as the impetus 
for this introduction. 
3
. Ludwig Teleky, History of· Factory arid Mine Hygiene (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. ·4,. 
3 
" 
.. 
-- . .. . . . . ·- - . .. - ~---
• 
.. 
- - - --------
I . 
,,-J . 
.. r 
physician. 4 For instan~e, Agricola devotes much attention to 
the importance of mine ventilation. 5 
Many of the maladies which Agricola cites correspond to 
' 
' 
the contemporary occupational safety and h~alth· concerns of·· 
I 
miners. One passage dealing with the effects of dust on 
breathing reminds the modern 
(".. 
reader of coal 
pneumoconiosis, commonly known as black lung disease: 
.•. the dust which is stirred and beaten 
up by digging penetrates into the 
windpipe and lungs, and produces 
difficulty in breathing ... rf the dust has 
corrosive qualities, it eats away the 
lungs, and implants consumption in the 
body; hence in the mines of the 
Carpathian Mountains women are found who 
have married seven husbands, all of whom 
this terrible consumption has carried off 
to a premature death. 6 
"" 
miners' 
Most important, one of Agricola's insightful statements 
summarizes the central theme of the contemporary occupational 
safety and health debate: 
... we should always devote more care to 
maintaining our health, that we may 
freely perform our bodily functions, than 
to making profits. 7 
4 Bern Dibner,n Agricola 
Burndy Library, 1958), p. 66. 
on Metals 
'. 
(Norwalk, 
5 Ibid. 
·A 
. 
6 G_eorgius Agricola, De Re Metallica, 
Clark ··Hoover an.d Lou · Henry Hoover (New 
Publications, 1950), p. 214. 
7 Ibid. 
4 
\. 
trans. 
York: 
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Dover 
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· The Father o·t Modern Industrial -· Medicin.e 
While Agricola is certainly important, one must rem~mber 
that t:he theme of his work is the study of mining in general,·,. 
rather than occupational safety and health. The first major 
• f 
treatise dealing spe,cj.fically with occupation~! disease; .. De 
Morbis Artificum Diatriba, was published in the early i 
eighteenth century by Bernardino Ramazzini, a professor at the 
University of Pa~ua. He classifies the causes of occupational 
disease into two categories:,· . ! 
The first and most potent is the harmf,ul. 
character of the materials that they 
handle, for these emit noxious vapors and 
very fine particles inimical to human 
beings and induce particular diseases; 
the second cause I ascribe to certain 
violent and irregular motions and 
unnatural postures of the body, by reason 
of which the natural structure of the 
vital machine is so impaired that serious 
diseases gradually develop therefrom. 8 
• 
Although two causes of occupational disease are 
• 
.• 
\ . 
-• . 
• 
mentioned, Ramazzini emphasizes exposure to toxic substances ) 
as the more dangerous of the two throughout the work. For 
'I 
' 
example, in the following passage, Ramazzinf states that his' 
treatise on occupational disease is a "novelty'' sgecifically ~ , 
because it analyzes the health effects of exposure to toxic 
substances, or ·~effluv·ia": 
But just as with the products· __ of the 
mechanical arts it nearly alw~ys happeris 
that· any, new invention by some· .craftsman 
is imperfect and immature but is· 
8 Ramazzini, p. 15. 
5 
• 
• 
.y,:r: 
.~ ' ' 
" 
...... ·.J 
• 
.,, 
'" " p '· 
perfected later by the industry of, 
others, so with literary work the same 
thing is bound to happen. I am aware 
· th -t such will-· be the fate of my. own 
tr atise ••• on · the diseases of 
WO ers . .. for ., , one thing because its 
subject is something· of a novelty. So 
far as I know, no one has set f cot· i_n 
this wide field, though from it one may 
gather a very · valuable crop of 
observations on the_ subtilitcl of effluvia 
and their powerful effe~ts. 
Also, in more than half the chapters, Ramazzini explains that 
/,J 
the chief risk to workers is the particles e)nitted from the 
,, materials which they must handle. 10 Thenefore, Ramazzini 's 
work is clea:i;ly relevant to a contemporary discussion, of 
occupational exposure to toxic substances. 
Moreover, Ramazzini is a significant figure in the 
development of occupational medicine in general because he was 
the first expert to encourage attending physicians to account 
for a patient's occupatio~ in the diagnosis and treatment of 
illness. After reviewing the traditional list of questions 
which a physician should ask a patient, Ramazzini asserts: ~-
I may venture to add one more question: 
What occupation does he follow? Though 
this question may be concerned with the 
exciting causes, yet I regard it as well 
timed or rather indispensable, and ~i ~-
should be particularly kept in mtnd when· 
the patient to be treated belongs to the 
common people. ,, In medical practice, 
however, I find that attention is har~ly 
ever paid to this matter, or if the 
doctor ?in a.ttendance kn·ows it without 
9 Ibid. , pp. 7 , 9. 
10 Wilmer cave Wright, "Introduction,'' in Ramazzini, 
• • • pp. XXVl. .... X~1l.. 
6 
•'· 
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<" 
asking, he gives. little heed to it, 
though for ~ffective tr~atment evidence 
of this sort has the utmost weight. 11 
Accordingly, he··regarded his treatise as a practical guide to 
"' 
be used.by physicians in their diagnosis and treatment, rather 
than a purely scholastic endeavor. Thus, Ramazzini published 
both the orig'inal vers·ion in 1700 and the 1713 revision in .. 
pocket size to encourage frequent use by physicians on their 
rounds. 12 
One might compare Ramazzini 's comments concerning the 
' 
awareness of physicians to the testimony of George Meany, 
president of the American Federation of.Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) , in the late 1960s. Meany's 
G 
remarks demonstrate the relevance of Ramazzini's insight to 
contemporary problems: 
••• our statistics fail to show the 
thousands of workers who die from causes 
related to their jobs but whose deaths 
are not recorded as. directly .... or 
indirectly caused by the doctors 
certifying the death certificates are 
unaware of the relationship of the job to 
the disease [sic] . 13 
Finally, Ramazzihi's work is notable for its sympathetic 
attitu~e toward the worki~g class, which the quotatiop at the· 
11 Ramazzini, p. 13. 
12 Wright, "Introduction," pp. xxvii-xxviii. 'l 
13 Statement of George Meany, President, American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
in U.S. Congress,-House of Representatives, Hearings before 
the Sele.ct Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education 
and Labor, 90th Cong •. , 2nd sess., February, 1-March 14, 1968, 
p. 705.. Emphasis added by this author.· 
7 
• I 
\ 
'' 
beginning of this chapter manifests. 14 Me wrote the treatise 
~ clearly on behalf of the working class: 
Wherefore do you,· kind reader, .. give ·a 
friendly reception to my treatise which, 
though no great work of art, was written 
for the good of the community, or at all 
events for the benefit- ·and ·comfort of the 
,. ' 
- working classes, and, if you please: 
Make al,lowance for a work written . not 
from ambition but from a sense of duty 
and to be of use. 15 
In sum, Ramazzini was s~essful in raising the question 
--
of how occupational factors contribute to illness. Indeed, 
I 
he is known as the father of modern i,ndustrial medicine. 16 
. . ' . ' "" Unfortunately, scientists and policy makers have been unable 
' 
to realize Ramazzini 's hope that his work would be "perfected" 
" 
later. The debate conce~ning the extent to which occupational 
factors cause disease continues. 
The Industrial Revolution 
' 
While Ramazzini promoted the topic of occupational heal th 
throughout the medical community, the advent of the Industrial 
Revolution increased the awareness of a larger audience. This 
awareness was part of a broader concern with the general 
' \• 
deterioration of working conditions caused by the Industrial 
Revolution. Accordingly, working conditions first became an 
issue in England, where the Industrial Revolution progressed 
.r 
14 Brown, "A Law Is Made, II p. 596. 
·~ 
15 • • 13. Ramazzini, p. 
16 Brown, "A Law Is Made, II p. 596. 
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'( 
most quickly. 
.. 
As previously noted, writers from various disciplines may 
.. 
demonstrate an interest in working conditions. For example, 
one nineteenth century critic of English working condit~on·s 
~ 
from the field of literature was the author Charles Dickens. 17 
Of course, Karl Marx is more closely associated with 
ninet~enth century English working conditions. "The Working 
Day," a chapter in volume one of. Capital, includes a 
discussion of the physical deterioration which labo~ers suffer 
when the capitalist extends the hours of work.~ To support his " 
thesis, Marx cites various governmental studies, including one 
which deals with physical deterioration among·potters: 
[Botn male and female potters] are, as a 
rule, stunted in growth, ill-shaped, and 
frequently ill-foriried in the chest; they 
become prematurely old, and are certainly 
short-lived; they are phlegmatic and 
bloodless, and exhibit their debility of 
constitution by obstinat~ attacks of 
dyspepsia, and disorders of the liver and 
kidneys, and by rheumatism. But of all 
di.seases they are espereially prone to 
chest-disease, to pneumonia, phthisis, 
bronchi tis, and . asthma. One form would 
appear peculiar to them, and is known a·'s 
potter's asthma, or potter's consumption. 
Scrofula attacking the glands, or bones, 
or other parts of the body, is a disease 
.,,, 
17 The theme of working conditions is most prominent in 
the novel Hard Times, which many critics have .deemed Dickens's 
most scathing indictment of Victorian soci~ty. For example, 
in The World of Charles Dickens · (London: Mar.tin Secker & 
Warburg Limited, 1~70), Angus Wilson states: "Hard Times is 
o.f the utmost importance in ·the extension and sharpening of 
Dickens's attitude to Victorian society. In it,he comes out 
strongly against Victorian ~regress as it was viewed by the 
materialist, laissez-faire capitalists" (p. 235). 
9 
y 
,.~ 
.. 
of two-thirds or mo~e of the· potters;.~ 18 
In this same chapter, Marx also evaluates the effects of 
~ 
English governmental regulation on working conditions. This 
system of regulation is known as factory legislation. 
Noble provides the following definition: 
., [Factory legislation] refers to the 
supervision by government of employer 
' practices, inclu~ing the setting of 
detailed standards that mandate cha~ges 
in the design pf work and machinery and 
that are enforced by penalty-based 
inspections. 19 , 
' Charles 
Factory legislation became the 1cornerstone 
\ 
of· American 
occupational safety and healtQ policy. · Incieed, one can 
consider the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which 
led to the creation of·OSHA, to be an enhanced version of 
factory legislation as defined above. Thus, a survey of 
) 
nineteenth century factory legislation, both in England and 
on the Continent, is useful for understanding ·the American 
experience. 20 
One can begin a discussion of nineteenth century English 
factory legislation by observing three basic trends .. First, 
18 Children's Employment Commission, First Report, London, 
1863, p. 24, in Karl Marx, Capital, vol. I,- trans. Ben Fowkes 
(New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 354-55. 
19 Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: 
of OSHA (Philadelphia: Temple University 
30-31 . 
The Rise and Fall 
Press, 1986), pp. 
. · 
20 The following discussion of 19th-Century English artd 
German factory legislation is based· upon materia_1 · ·found . in 
Teleky, pp •. 22-43. A summary of this history is alsq found 
. ' in Noble, p. 31. 
10 
... r ... 
J 
.. I 
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"·1 
occupationa~ safety and heal th provisions were intersperse.a 
) 
• 
with provisions concerning general working conditions, such 
'· 
as hours of work. In addition, children were the fir~t group 
of workers to benefit from regulation. Furthermore, the first 
sector to be ,;regulated was the textile industry· .. , 
The Health and Morals of Apprentices Act of 1802, 
designed to protect children working in the textile industry, 
contained several occupational health provisions., Factory 
walls··were to be white~ashed twice a year, and workplaces were 
to be adequately ventilated. Moreover, the Act implemented . 
the first step in establishing a system of inspection: 
"visitors" who were appointed to inspect factories could order 
the adoption of sanitary regulations. However, since these 
positions were merely honorary, "visitors were rarely 
appointed and still more rarely were they active. 1121 The 
Althorp Act of 1833, which also protected children in the 
textile industry, was more beneficial because it required theQ 
<7 
appointment of factory inspectors ~or its enforcement. 
Accident prevention was first addressed in 1844, when 
legislation mandated the installation of guards on certain 
types of machines. Inspectors were authorized to • issue 
. 
written- notice to an emplo~er to place guards on dangero~s 
machines immediately if they were missing, but the employer, · 
was permitted to refer the matter to arbitration. Factory 
·, 
inspectors were also authorized to, appoint "certifying 
21 Ibid., p. 22. 
11 
- ~. 
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' ' 
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I 
surgeons. '' An employer was reqllired to report any accident 
to 'the ·certifying surgeon, who ·investigated the cause of the 
accident. The _provision that any fines collected fo~ employer 
' ) 
ndncompliance co~ld be given to the worker injured in the 
accident demonstrates that the employer was held responsible 
I 
for occupational safety. Finally, although the textile 
industry was still the only affected sector, this law extended 
protection to women. 
Laws passed during the 1860s ext~nded protection beyond 
\ 
the textile industry to other sectors. In additron, 
legislation of the 1860s contained more extensive regulation 
of occupational safety and health for workers of both sexes 
and all ages. 22 While the protection of men often had been a 
tangential result of previous occupational safety and health 
provisions, such provisions were designed primarily to aid 
children and women. Another milestone in the development of 
English factory legislation was the Factory and Workshop Act 
of 1878, which consolidated the system of factory inspection 
\, 
) 
under a single central ~uthority with a chief inspector in 
London. 
"' Germany provides the best example of nineteenth century 
factory legislation on the Continent, although it experi~nced 
... 
the Industrial Revolution half a century after England and was 
-
not ·unified until 1871. Both of these factors delayed 
22 • Ibid., p. 31. 
• 
12 
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.. 
Germany's efforts to regulate working conditions; 23 
The first unified effort to structure the field of labor 
legislation was the North German Confederation's adoption of 
I 
the ,.Gewerbeordnung, an industrial code regulating all aspects 
of labor and trade, in 1869. Under the Gewerbeordnung, every 
German state had the right to appoint ·factory inspectors but 
' 
was not required to do so. 
With the achievement of political unity in 1871, the 
Gewerbeordnung was incorporated into the German Empire's 
J 
industrial code, the Reichsgewerbeordnung. In 1878 the 
Reichsgewerbeordnung was amended to mandate factory inspection 
throughout the Empire. 
Despite the late appearance of unified · German labor 
regulation, the · traditional predispositiron of German 
governments to intervene in the private sector was conducive 
to the growth of this type of regulat,ion. 24 
" 
In England, where 
23 The author of this thesis is referring to the efforts 
of a unified German state for purposes of comparison to 
England. This author is not suggesting that the independent 
German states failed to regulate working conditions. On the 
contrary, Teleky provides examples to demonstrate that the 
independent German states did regulate working conditions 
before achieving political unity in 1871 (pp. 41-42). 
However, he notes that the decentralization of power hinders 
research attempts to assemble a· comprehensive history of 
• • • • German labor legislation before 1871 (p. 40). , 
\ 
24 Ibid., p. 39. One could cite the W~st German poiicy 
of Mitbestimmung, or codet~rmination, to· support the argument 
that this tradition is still apparent tbday. Noble defines 
codetermination as ''efforts to involve workers, through thei.r 
unions, in corporate decision making'' (p .. ·• 35) • He notes that 
this concept includes decisions about occupational safety and 
health. 
13 
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Adam Smith's ''invisible hand" and the cap.italist doctrine of 
laissez-faire were firmly implanted, labor regulation was 
stridently opposed by business interests. 25 
Scope of the Thesis 
Simila~ly, business interests in the U. s. have 
health contested ·'.. . occupational safety and continually 
regulation. OSHA' s regulation of occupational exposure ·to 
toxic substances' provides an especially relevant example 
because it is an area of scientific uncertainty. Business 
interests, as well as organized labor and other groups with 
a stake in the can manipulate the information which ~ • issue, 
they present to policy makers but at the same time legitimate 
such manipulation by claiming scientific objectivity. 
Thus, the fundamental issue which this thesis examines 
is the extent to which political considerations should 
influence regulatory policy under conditions of scientific 
uncertainty. The work begins with • an overview of the 
historical foundations of U.S. occupational safety and health 
policy. Chapter I traces the dey~lopment of U.S. policy from 
its origins as a patchwork of state policies and private 
initiatives to the emergence of occupational safety and heal th 
on the federal policy agenda. The ch~pter then discusses the 
legislative process which led to the creation of· OSHA and 
examines the evolution from safety to health concerns which 
25 Teleky, pp. 23, 39. 
14 
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has characterized OSHA' s policy development. Finally, Chapter 
I concludes with a consideration of whether ·particip'ants in 
the creation of the federal regulatory program were aware that .. 
such an evolution would occur. 
- . ' 
Chapter II outlines '.the regulatort fram·ework for 
occupational exposure to toxic subs~ances. It begins with an 
('---/-~xploration of risk 
regulatory process. 
as~essment, the foundation of OSHA' s 
The chapter then addresses the 
• 
promulgation of standards and provides an overview of OSHA's 
standard-setting activity for toxic substances. After a brief 
discussion of inspection, enforcement, and the role of the 
independent • • commission, the chapter concludes with an 
examination of judicial review of standards under conditions 
of scientific uncertainty • 
~ 
Chapter III applies ·the history included in Chapter I and 
' 
the framework discussed in Chapter II to OSHA's regulation· of 
formaldehyde. After • • examining formaldehyde's chemical 
properties and the health effects of occupational exposure, 
the_ chapter reviews the history- of formaldehyde regulation, 
the new standard which was promulgated in December 1987, and 
subsequent developments. In accordance with the fundamental 
issue of the thesis, Chapter III emphasizes the role which 
subjective, political factors have played in OSHA' s regulation 
of formaldehyde. 
This thesis concludes that regulatory policy under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty should take subjective, 
15 
l>.j' 
• 
.. 
I 
I, 
• ,i .,. 
' 
political factors into account. However, some elements of the 
regulatory policy process can take such ~actors into account· 
better than other elements. Accordingly, the conclusion of 
l • . 
the thesis examines the appropriate roles of Congress, tthe 
judiciary, and the bureaucracy in OSHA's regulation of 
occupational exposure to toxic substances. 
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THE ORIGINS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Congress declares it to be its 
purpose and policy ..• to assure so far as 
possib·le ev~ry working man and woman in 
the Nation safe and healthful working 
conditions and to preserve our numari 
1 resources ... 
Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 
' . 
U.S. Policy Before OSHA 
\ 
/ 
Before the creation of OSHA, u. s. occupational safety and 
health policy consisted of an amalgam of state policies and 
private, voluntary action among firms. Although the fede~al 
~ 
government initiated regulation during the New Deal era, its 
involvement was limited. 2 
1 ' Pub.L. 91-596, Sec. 2, Dec. 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, 29 
u.s.c.~. sec. 651(b) (1985). 
2 An extensive history of U. s. policy before OSHA -is · 
found in Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall. 
of OSHA (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), pp. 
39-67. A summary is found in Nicholas Ashford, Crisis in the. 
Workplace: Occupational Disease ~~d Injury, A,Report to the 
Ford Foundation (Cambridge, Mass.: · The MIT ~~ess, 1976), pp. 
41-~2. Much of the material in this section .is drawn from 
these sources. 
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Factory legislation has· generally . served as the 
,j 
foundation of both state and federal regulatory programs. 3 
Massachusetts instituted the nation's first Department of 
' 
Factory Inspection in 1867 and adopted the first occupational 
' 
safety law in 1877. 4 By the early twentieth century, most 
states had implemented some form of factory legislation 
regulating occupational safety and health. 5 
While states continued to use factory legislation as 
•, 
their primary regul~tory method throughout the twentieth 
century, such programs were ineffective for several re,sons. 6 
First, their major weakness was their reliance upon voluntary 
cooperation by industry, since agency enforcement powers were 
often significantly restricted. The division of authority 
,; 
among • various t.o • agencies contributed state also 
.. ..... 
ineff ecti venes·s. Furthermore, because state programs were 
3 From a comparative perspective, Noble discusses methods 
of governmental intervention which. have not been used in the 
development of American occupational safety and health policy 
(p.' 35) ~ Some of these methods allow employees to participate 
more extensively in in-plant and enforcement programs. An 
example is codetermination, which is discussed in footnote 24 
of the Introduction. 
4 Roland P. Blake, ed., Industrial Safety (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice~Hall, 1963), pp. 13, 22, in Ashford, 
p. 47; Steven Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Health 
Admin'istration," in. James Q. Wilson, ed., The Politics of 
Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 238; Noble,Lp. 
31. \, 
5 Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Heal th, " p. 2 3 8, 
citing Ashford, pp. 47-50; Noble, p. 31. 
6 . Noble, pp. 56-57. 
I . 
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often ,··poorly funded, sta_ffing shortages were common. Such 
. ' 
shortages meant a smaller number of inspectors, and, 
consequently, a ·1ack of enforcement. Moreover, state 
~ e 
regulation usually focused upon safety at the expense of 
health concerns. In addition, many states relied upon weak 
and outdated standards. Finally, the effectiveness of state 
programs was directly proportional to the level of industrial 
development and unionization. In other words, highly 
industrialized states with strong unions provided better 
protection than states with less industrial development and 
unionization. 
.;t 
States suppleme·nted their regulatory programs with 
policies to compensate workers for job-related injuries. Early 
policies focused upon legal liability. Using tort law, an 
employee could recover compensatory damages for • • • 1nJur1es 
caused by the employer's failure to provide safe working 
conditions. · Legal 1 iabil i ty should have functioned as an 
' incentive system to alter the behavior of firms. In other 
words, unsafe firms should have improved working conditions 
because they ,,faced the possibility of 
·compensatory awards to injured employees. 
/ 
•' 
• paying large 
However, three strong defenses against such suits were 
, traditionally available to employ·ers. First, the assumption-
' . 
of-risk doctrine predicated that the employer could not be · 
found ·1iable- if the hazard was an inherent··part ·of the .job. 
Thus, when the employee accepted the · position, he also 
,, 
' .. 
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accepted the risk that he might be injured. In addition, 
according to the fellow-servant doctrine, the employer was not 
1~·iable if he proved that another· employee's neglig·ence 
' 
contributed to the injury. Similarly, the employer could not 
be found liable under the contribytory-negligence doctrine if 
he pr~ved that the employee's actions caused his own injury. 
Legal liability was superseded by the workers' 
( ' 
compensation insurance system in the early twentieth century. 
Under . this system, employers contribute to a fund which 
finances compensatory payments. In return for • • receiving 
regularly scheduled . compensatory payments from the fund, 
workers relinquish the right to sue employers for damages. 
If employers are experience rated, or charged • insurance 
premiums based upon their safety records, this system can also 
function as an incentive for employers to im-prove working 
conditions. 
/· Because of the effectiveness of the defenses discussed 
above, Noble asserts that the policy shift to worker's 
compensation benefitted the employee. 7 However, he also notes 
that this change was advantageous to business because it . 
regularized the cost of safety and health. 8 
$ In other words, 
workers' compensation insurance eliminated the. risk of paying 
potentially exorbitant compensatory awards. For this reason, 
the American Federation of Labor (AFL) resisted the 
7 rbia., p. 54. 
8 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
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implementation of a workers' compensation system.
9 Rather, 
the organization favored strengthening the existing lega_l 
liability system. However, business interests dominated the 
policy debate, and the AFL belatedly endorsed workers' 
c~mpensation. 
This shift in occupational ~afety and health policy was 
' "' • _f ·1 ~- • I • 
only one of the results of a strategy of preemptive reform 
established by industry during the Progressive era. 
10 Business 
often supported the adoption of moderate ref arms, such as 
workers' compensation, in order to allay the concerns of 
workers before they became an impetus for protest. Of course, 
c-
protest could have served as a catalyst fo! the adoption of 
policies detrimental to industrial interests. Thus, business 
maintained control of the policy agenda. In terms of 
occupational safety and health policy, preemptive reform 
continued ·until the creation of OSHA. 
"-
It is important to note that workers' compensation has 
remained an integral part of occupational safety and health 
. policy. Indeed, President Lyndon Johnson considered reforming 
' 
the workers' compensation system as a concomitant to 
establishing a federal occupational safety and health 
regulatory program in the late 1960s. 11
 While organrz'ed labor 
supported reform, the President's advisors realized that the 
9 . Ibid. , p .. 4 3 • 
. , 
10 , Ibid., p. 41. 
11 , Ibid., pp. 88--89. 
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states and insurance interests would strongly' resist federal 
initiatives in .this area. Thus, the potentially 1 limited 
! 
reforms which might have been achieved would not have 
justified the political battles required to implement the 
program. Consequently, the states have maintained control. of 
the system, although the federal government does admin\ster 
a few narrowly defined compensation programs. 
Despite the continuing importance of compensation 
programs, a caveat is that their existence does not eliminate 
the need for regulatory policy. The incentives inherent in ( 
these programs are not strong enough in and of ·themselves to 
ensure that employer.s will provide safe and heal thy 
iJ 
workplaces. Thus, the most appropriate function of 
compensation programs is to supplement regulatory policy. 
In addition to a patchwork of state policies, 
occupational safety and health before OSHA was also 
characterized by private, voluntary action among business 
interests. Again, by seizing the initiative, industry could 
control the policy agenda, just as it had in the adoption of 
workers' compensation. For example, with motives of self-
interest, U.S. Steel extensively promoted occupational safety 
. 
and heal th among its employees. 12 
,, 
Not only did public concern 
about working conditions focus upon the steel industry because 
of its poor safety record, 1:?ut. the company may also have 
feared that a deterioration in .working conditions might 
12 b. d I 1 ., p. 41. 
'; 
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stimulate unionization efforts. 13 
Private, voluntary action by industry in ·· the 
establishment of safety and health standards has had the ~est 
significant consequences for future policy formation. 
Although professional· associations were the first 
organizations to establish standards, the objectivity o·f these 
groups was questionable because business interests often 
exercised influence among them. The dev\elopment of the United 
States of America Standards Institute (USASI), the predecessor 
of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), provides 
• 
an example. 14 The organization was founded by professionals 
in conjunction with the Departments of War, Commerce, and Navy 
to encourage the standardization of industrial products and 
processes. However, during the 1920s, an increasing number 
of business interests began to exercise influence within the 
organization. Later, when the organization began to establish 
occupational safety and heal th standards, industry could exert 
this influence over the standard-setting process. 
Tracing the role of industry ·throughout ANSI's history 
is especially relevant because ANSI continues to be one of the 
most important private sources of standards. Indeed, at OSHA·• s 
inception, the agency adopted many ANSI standards to serve as 
.. . ' 
federal standards. Thu$, one could conclude that OSHA adopted 
standards which , favored business interests. The following 
13 Ibid~-, p. 41; see also p. 250, note 5 •. 
·~ 
14 Ibid., p. 44. 
I 
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excerpt from a 1970 Labor Department report supports this 
assertion: 
One of the weaknesses of the standards 
process, in respect to occupational 
safety and heal th standards and con,sumer 
goods standards has always been that the 
consumer, the working man or the 
housewife, has always spoken with a very 
weak voice in the councils of the 
standardizing bodies. 15 
An exception to · the ,rule of corporate influence of 
standard-setting involves the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) • 16 This 
organization was formed in the 1930s by reformers in the 
industrial h.ygiene profession who were dissatisfied with 
industry's incre~sing influence in· their field. It became 
important~for future policy development because it established 
.--
threshold limit values (TLVs) for exposure to toxic 
substances, and OSHA used these limits in many of the health 
standards adopted at the agency's inception. ;:• 
The first significant federal endeavor in the field of 
occupational safety and health regulation occurred during the 
, New Deal. 17 The Walsh-Healey Act of 1936 includes a safety and 
t 
health provision, June 30, 1936, c. 881, Sec. 1, 49 Stat. 
2036, as amended, 41 U.S.C.A. Sec. 35(e) .(1987). This 
15 standards and Regulations, Report. _ Department .of 
Labor, Record Group_ 174, Ja'mes D. HoJigson, 1970, File LL-2-3, 
OSH, National Archives, in Noble, p.p. 45-46. 
16 Noqle, pp. 46-47. . ·11, .. 
17 Appendix I discusses federal regulation of mine. safety 
and health ,before the New Deal. 
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legislation· was originally designed as a provisional measure 
to establish minimum wages on federal contracts exceeding 
I) 
$10,000 until the constitutionality of a permanent, general 
~1' 
minimum wage law could be determined. 18 Although the safety 
and health provision was not central to the legislation, it 
was included to ensure that firms competing for federal 
contracts would not compromise working conditions in order to 
compensate for their higher wage costs. 19 While the adoption 
of the Act was an important milestone because it marked the 
' beginning of federal jurisdiction over occupational safety and 
health, federal reliance upon state programs and enforcement 
is apparent in the provision: 
•.. no part of such contract will be 
performed nor will any of the materials, 
supplies, articles, or equipment to be 
manufactured or furnished under said 
contract be manufactured or fabricated in 
any plants, factories, buildings, ·or 
surroundings or under working conditions 
which are unsanitary or hazardous or 
dangerous to the health and safety of 
employees engaged in the performance of 
said contract. Compliance with the 
safety, sanitary, and factory insp~ction 
laws of the State in which the work or 
part thereof is to be performed shall be 
prima-facie evidence of compliance with 
this subsection, 41 U.S.C.A. Sec. 35(e) 
(1987). 
Despite the progress in federal policy associated with 
the Walsh-Healey Act, one can generally conclude that solving 
the • economic problems caused by the Great Depression took 
18 Nobie, p. 57. 
19 • Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
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precedence over safety and health efforts. 20 Similarly, 
Nicholas Ashford asserts that interest in the topic decreased 
' ,. . . 
. 
durl.ng World War II, again because the nat1.01'1: faced other 
pressing problems. 21 However, Noble contends that interest in 
occupational safety and health increased during the period 
because of public concern about • conserving scarce labor 
resources. 22 Noble cites as evidence the 'fact that war boarqs 
often urged employers to improve working conditions and that 
the social security system was used to finance state programs 
through grants-in-aid to state agencies. 23 
Both Noble and Ashford agree that occupational safety and 
\ 
health became an issue of low priority during the postwar 
era. 24 The chief reason was that the system of industrial 
relations promoted by the federal government throughout the 
New Deal and World War II restricted debate on labor policy 
to economic issues. Most important, occupational safety and 
• 
heal th was not recognized by the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) as a mandatory subject for collective bargaining 
until 1966. 25 However, one must note that organized labor also 
encouraged this emphasis upon economic issues in collective 
20 Ashford, p. 51. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Noble, p. · 58. 
23 Ibid. 
24 • Ibid.; Ashford, p. 52. 
25 Noble, p. 52; Ashford, p. 493. 
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bargaining. 26 Furthermore, it focused its lobbying efforts 
upon full employment and economic security policies as well. 27 
· ·only the United Auto Workers (UAW) provided an exception 
to the rule by promoting occupational safety and heal th 
programs, especially in contract negotiations. In a recent 
·· interview, former UAW president Douglas Fraser commented on 
the relationship between collective bargaining and working 
conditions: 
We have OSHA ... which is helpful in 
setting standards in those places that 
don't have a union and those places that 
have a weak union. OSHA doesn't help the 
auto· workers and steel workers because 
we're strong enough ourselves to 
discipline the company ... If plants aren't 
safer today, the union isn't doing its job. 28 
Later in this thesis, the UAW' s use of other methods to 
influence policy"~ill be examined. Specifically, the union's 
activity regarding the regulation of formaldehyde will 
demonstrate that it continues to lead advocacy efforts for 
occupational safety and health. 
Because organized labor did not emphasize occupational 
safety and health, the Department of Labor did not have an 
incentive to propose comprehensive policy initiatives. 
Nevertheless, the Department continued to extend its 
26 Noble, pp. 48-53; Ashford, pp. 492-93. 
27 Noble, p. 49. 
28 Dan Shope', "Dou.glas Fraser's finger still on the pul.Pe 
of labor,'' The Morning Call [~llentown, PA], May 28, 1989, p. 
011. 
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jurisdiction incrementally in certain industries during the 
postwar era. For example·, amendments passed in 1958 enabled 
the Secretary of Labor to regulate safety and heal th for 
workers covered by the Longshoremen' s and Harbor Workers ' 
Compensation Act, Pub.L. 85-742, Sec. 1, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 
Sta,t. 835, as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. Sec .... 941 (1986) . 29 
Moreover, the Service Contract Act of 1965 extended protection 
to those employed by the federal government's t' service 
suppliers, Pub.L. 89-286, Sec. 2, Oct. 22, 1965, 79 Stat. 
1034, as amended, 41 U.S.C.A. Sec. 351(a) (3) (1987). Hence, 
by the late 1960s, the Department of Labor regulated some 
aspect of occupational safety and health for over half of the 
nation's workforce, as shown in Table 1.1. 
However, federal regulatory programs were often poorly 
funded, and they generally relied upon enforcement by the 
states, as noted in the discussion of Walsh-Healey. 3° For 
reasons previously discussed, state,enforcement was generally 
ineffective. Furthermore, this situation led to 
jurisdictional disputes between the federal and state 
governments. 31 In this environment, industry could continue 
29 An amendment changed all references to the Act from 
"Longshoremen's'' to "Longshore,'' Pub.L. 98-426, Sec. 27(d) (1), 
Sept. 28, 1984, 98 Stat. 1654. 
30 An exception was the Service Contract Act, whic;:h 
granted the secretary . of labor authority to develop and 
enforce regulations independently_of the states (Noble,_ p. 
252, note 35). · 
31 Ibid. , p. 60. 
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Authority 
Maritime Safety Act 
Longshoring 
Shipyards 
Marine construction 
Walsh-Healey Act 
Service Contracts Act 
Vocational Rehabilitation 
Arts and Humanities Act 
Workers Covered8 
103,000 
120,000 
20, 00.0-100, 000 
Federal Labor Standards Act 
Federal Employment 
Compensation Act 
25,000,000 
6,000,000 
150,000 
10,000 
8,250,000 
" 
()< 
2,800,000 
TOTAL 42,493,000 
(56.7% of labor force) 
Expenditure 
Per Workerb 
$8.84 
3.19 
0.0 
0.01 
0.06 
0.0 
0.0 
0.01 
0.07 
0.05 
(average) 
Table 1.1. Department of Labor Jurisdiction, 1967. 
Source: Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and 
Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1986), p. 59, citing Current Department 
of Labor Responsibilities and Activities, 
Attachment Six (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Labor, 1968). 
a Citing Current Department of Labor Responsibilities and 
Activities, Attachment Six (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
. Labor, 1968), Noble states: ''The department estimated a 
workforce · of 75 million workers and Department of Labor 
authority over almost 43 million workers. This estimate is 
based on Walsh-Healey Act coverage of app.roximately 25 million 
employees at on~ time or another each year. Other programs 
accounted for another 15 to 20 million workers. Note that 
this includes coverage of any part of the worker's day" (p. 
252,.note 35). 
"· 
b . Noble defines · expendi~ure per worker as "the total 
expenditure· ~·per program divid_ed by the number -of _ workers 
covered by that program" (p. 59). 
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to exercise influence over occupational safety and heal th 
policy through private, voluntary action. 
A clear, comprehensive occupational safety and heal th 
plan needed to be included on 'the federal policy agenda in 
order to ensure effective protection for all workers. As a 
representative of organized labor commented: 
We have worked with management whenever 
possible to (promote occupational safety 
and health], and we have urged the States 
to fulfill their responsibilities in this 
regard. These efforts ha:ve simply not 
been enough, as the record attests. It 
is time, and · well past time, for the 
Federal Government to act. Much of what 
needs to be done is too large a job for 
any lesser entity. 32 
Federal Agenda Formation 
An interesting narrative is often presented to explain 
how occupational safety and heal th became an issue on t·he 
federal policy agenda. 33 It maintains that the brother of 
Robert Hardesty, one of President Johnson's speechwriters, 
worked at the Bureau of Occupational Safety and Health 
32 Statement of Alan Burch, International Union of 
Operating Engineers, in U.S. Congress, House of 
Representatives, Hearings before the S~lect Subcommittee on 
Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 2nd 
sess., February 1-March 14, 19~ P-• 277. ~reafter in this 
chapter cited as House Hearings, 1968. 
33 The narrative is found in Kelman, ''Occupational s fety 
-
. _-· 
and Health," p. 239. On ·P· 429, note 12, Kelman c es 
chapters 7 and 8 of Joseph· A. Page and Mary-Win O'Brien, 
Bitter Wages (New York: Grossman, 1973) as the sour¢e. Noble 
refers to this narrative as the "standard explanation" (p. 81) 
and al·so cites Page and O'Brien as the source (_p. 256, · note 
25) • . 
,, 
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(BOSH) • 34 Consequently, Hardesty became in.formed about 
occupational safety and health from his brother and included 
references to the topic in presidential speeches. 
During this period, Esther Peterson, an assistant 
.. 
secretary in the Department of Labor, investigated reports of 
a high incidence of lung cancer among uranium miners. After 
\.,. 
visiting with miners and their families, Peterson became so 
interested that she pressed the issue personally with Labor 
Secretary Williard Wirtz. 
The combination of references to the topic in previous 
presidential speeches and Peterson's investigation led the 
Labor Department to include a draft of an occupational safety 
and health bill in a package of legislative proposals to the 
President. The President called for a new occupational safety 
~ 
and health program in his 1968 Manpower Message, although the 
Labor Department had not exerted much pressure on him to do 
so. As Secretary Wirtz later commented: "We didn't know, 
frankly, till several days before the Message that the 
President had decided to make occupational safety and health 
a principal element in his program th.is year. 1135 
( 
Using ~his account as }:lis basis, Kelman describes the 
process by which occupational safety and health became 
34 This agenfy in the Department of Health, Education,· and 
. . . .· Welfare (HEW) functioned as a research body but did not have 
regulatqry authority. 
35 Page and O'Brien, ._Bitter. Wages, p. 140, in Kelman, 
"Occupational Safety and Health," p. 239. 
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included on the federal agenda as ''idiosyncrat
ic. 1136 H·e 
.. 
asserts that the promotion of occupational safety
 and health 
by the Department of Labor and President Lyndon John
son in the 
' 
late 1960s was not a result of the activity of
 interest 
groups, such as organized labor. Rather, through 
a chain of 
coincidences, officials who were searching for "go
od causes" 
tf> promote chose occupational safety and heal th 
as such a 
cause. •. 
Clearly, Kelman's interpretation of the narrative 
is too 
simplistic. It does not explain the underlying forc
es at work 
in the process of federal agenda formation. Noble 
summarizes 
the narrative's relevance as follows: 
Although accurate in one respect--the 
fraternal connection was real--this 
account is misleading. It suggests that 
·the policymaking process in this instance 
was more serendipitous than it actually 
was, and it argues. for the view that the 
issue and the [Occupational Safety and 
Health] Act were poorly understood or 
thought out. 37 
The most plausible explanation of how occupational s
afety 
and health became included on the federal policy ag
enda takes 
into account the transformation of the agenda its
elf during 
the 1960s. 38 The economic prosperity of the period
-bolstered 
the expansion of the agenda to include new social
 programs, 
such as President Johnson's Great Society, as
 well as 
36 Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Health," pp. 239-
40. 
I 
37 Noble, p. 81. Emphasis added by this author. 
38 I Ibid.; pp. 68-69. 
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initiatives in environmentalism and consumer product safety, 
two policy areas related to occupational safety and health. 
Al though the combination of a new agenda and a sound 
economy eventually, convinced organized labor to shift its 
focus from tangible, economic gains to nonwage demands by the 
late 1960s, union support for occupational safety and health 
was slow to appear for several reasons. Especially relevant 
to this thesis, the impediments were related to occupational 
health. First, Noble asserts that certain high-ranking union 
officials, including George Meany, were aware of the 
occupational heal th problem but simply indifferent to its 
promotion. 39 They preferred to limit union activity to the 
traditional economic sphere. However, the more common 
situation among members of organized labor was their ignorance 
of the occupational health problem because of the paucity of 
information available about health hazards. For example, the 
comments of Douglas Fraser are illustrative: 
In our time, we were ignorant in terms of 
the chemical substances in the work 
place. I remember in the machine shop 
where guys would get rashes from the tip 
· of their fingers up their arms because of 
the fluid in the cutting oil. We'd just 
say the guy had sensitive skin. 40 
The promotion of. occupational heal th began when the 
growth of the environmental, consumer product safety, and 
39 • Ibid. , p. 71. 
40 Shope, "Douglas Fraser's finger still on the pulse of 
labor," p. 011. · 
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public interest movements increased awareness of the problem 
among a small group of union leaders. Environmentalists were 
especially important in this process. For instance, Anthony 
Mazzochi, a leader of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers 
(OCAW) during the period, credits environmentalists with 
showing him how occupational.health and environmental issues 
were linked. 41 Mazzoffchi and others formed an alliance with the 
environmentalists to capitalize upon the linkage . ? The 
. alliance focused upon presenting the in-plant environment as 
an extension of the outdoor environment. 42 Thus, occupational 
health was framed as an issue affecting not only org~nized 
labor, but also all other workers and the entire population. 
In this manner, organized labor legitimated the issue as a 
~ 
concern of a broad constituency, rather than a "special" 
interest of unions. 43 
The testimony of one Mazzochi's colleagues from the OCAW 
before a House subcommittee 
philosophy of the alliance: 
I 1n 1968 demonstrates the 
Our local feels very strongly that 
Federal legislation of the sort embodied 
in this bill is an absolute necessity for 
the protection not only of the workers in 
the plants but also the general public, 
particularly those people who- live near 
41 Noble, p. 255, note 18. 
42 Ibid., p. 78; see also p. 255, note 19. 
43 • Ibid., p. 78. 
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the plants. 44 
In addition to the efforts of this small group of union 
ll. 
ti' 
leaders, the other factor which contri~uted to organized 
labor's adoption of occupational safety and health was the 
increase in union rank-and-file discontent during the 1960s. 45 
Specifically, rank-and-file members who were employed • 1n 
particularly dangerous occupations organized their own grass-
roots mo~ements to promote occupational safety and health. 
The wildcat protests of Qoal miners in West Virginia and 
Kentucky exemplify this type of discontent. Their activities 
b ~'~ 
contributed to the awareness of organized labor as a whole and 
the public. Moreover, their efforts led to the adoption of 
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub.L. 
91-173, Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 742, as amended, a watershed 
j 
in the history of U. s. mine safety and he~l th regulation. 46 
This Act enabled the Secretary of the Interior to 
promulgate mandatory safety and health standards for 
underground mines. Enforcement powers were vested in the 
Interior Department's Bureau of Mines. It also guaranteed 
compensation to miners disabled by black lung disease or their 
widows and funded research on the disease. The comprehensive 
44 Statement of R. L. Barnes, President of Local 4-367 of 
th~ Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, in 
House Hearings, 1968, p. 383. 
.• ' 
45 Noble, pp. 70-71. 
46 Subsequent amendments and changes in regulatory 
activity are discussed in Appendix I . 
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protection provide·d by this legi~lation served as an impetus 
for the adoption of a general occupational safety and health 
law. 
I 
In sum, the activities of a small group of union leaders 
and rank-and-file members convinced organized labor as a whole •' 
to adopt the issue and garnered public support. Consequently, 
the Johnson Administration had several political motives for 
promoting occupational safety and~health, rather than a mere 
search for "good causes," as Kelman suggests. For instance, 
while organized labor had trapitionally composed a stalwart 
faction of the Democratic Party, there was evidence that labor 
had begun to turn away from the Party because of its increased " 
emphasis on civil rights during this period. 47 Hence, 
promoting occupational safety and health would appease 
organized labor. An additional political benefit was related 
to the alliance discussed above. Traditionally, the middle 
class had been skeptical about supporting labor issues because ii ' . ' 
v it viewed organized labor as a "special interest. 1148 However, 
because the middle class formed the basis of support for the 
environmental, consumer, and public interest movements, 
occupational safety and health was an exception. 49 
Moreover, economic factors also led Johnson to promote ', 
• issue. Despite the period's prosperity, • • increasing 
the 
47 Noble, p. 80. 'I'- ':I 
48 Ibid., p. 81. 
49 Ibid. 
b 
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involvement in Vietnam was draining·resources at the same time 
that the Great Society's new, expensive social programs were 
being implemented. Occupational safety and heal th was a 
social program in the tradition of the Great Society but less 
costly to implement,. 50 
Finally, concern about the • • increasing industrial 
accident rate of the late 1960s, shown in Figure 1.1, may have 
contributed to the emergence of occupational sa'fety and heal th 
on the federal policy agenda. As previously discussed, while 
information about occupational health hazards was limited, 
data on industrial injuries were traditionally available. 
In conclusion, the transformation of the federal policy 
agenda during the 1960s offers the best explanation of the 
emergence of occupational safety and health as an issue on 
' 
that agenda. The period's prosperous economy enabled an 
expansion of the agenda. Both of these factors led organized 
labor to shift its focus from tangible, economic gains to 
nonwage demands, such as occupational safety and ·heal th. This 
process began with certain foresighted labor leaders who 
realized the importance of occupational health and formed an 
alliance with the leaders of other movements, especially the 
environmentalists. Their efforts, along with rank-and-file 
protest, contributed to organized labor's adoption of the 
issue and garnered public support. Furthermore, political and 
economic motives caused President Johnson to promote 
50 Ibid_., pp. 79-80. 
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Figure 1.1. Manufacturing Work Injury Rates, 1956-70. 
Source: Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and 
Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1986), p. 62, citing Robert S. Smith, The 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), figure 
1. 
a "Injury rates are adjusted for cyclical- changes in 
-· overtime, hiri:ng, and capacity utilization," Charles· Noble, 
Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1986), p. 62. ~ 
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occupational safety and health. Finally, • • an increasing 
industrial injury rate during the period contributed to the 
emergence of occupational safety and heal th as an issue on the 
federal policy agenda. 
How did business lose control of the policy agenda? As 
... 
previously discussed, industry had maintained control'', of the 
policy agenda through its reliance upon private, voluntary 
action until the 1960s. Ironically, by rigidly continuing to 
espouse private, voluntary action instead of adapting to a 
changing socio-political environment, business lost control 
of the agenda. As Noble asserts, industry refused to admit 
' 
that a need for federal regulation existed although the trend 
in all policy areas during the period was toward federal 
(/ 
.. intervention. 51 
Similarly, business could have tried to reassert its 
interests in the legislative process by • using its old 
technique of seizing the initiative. However, instead of 
compromising, business continued to assume a defensive 
posture. An examination of the legislative process will show 
that this in~ffective strategy resulted in the adoption of a 
law which was stronger than Johnson's original proposal. 52 
51 • Ibid., pp. 83, 86. 
52 • Ibid., pp. 93-94. 
\ 
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Legislative History of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
The· Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub.L. 
91-596, Dec. 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. 
Sec. 651 et seq. (1985), provides the statutory ~{ramework for 
the federal government's regulatory program. Table 1.2 
provides a summary of the legislative history of the Act. 
As previously mentioned, the legislative process began 
with' President Johnson's outline of an occupational safety and 
health bill in his Manpower Message of 1968. The 
administration's bill was introduced into the House- of 
Representatives by Congressman James O'Hara (D-Michigan) and 
into the Senate by Senator Ralph Yarborough (D-Texas). 
O'Hara-Yarborough contained several key • • prov1s1ons. 
First, it directed the Secretary of HEW to conduct an 
extensive research program as the basis for developing 
comprehensive safety and health standards. In addition, the 
secretary of labor was granted both the power to promulgate 
standards· and the authority to enforce them. Furthermore, the 
secretary of labor was also granted the power to inspect 
... 
workplaces and to close down operations which posed imminent 
danger to employees. Finally, the bill provided for federal 
:P 
assistance to states to develop and strengthen their own 
occupational safety and health programs. 
Provisions of the O'Hara-Yarborough bill.sparked sev~ral 
debates which continued throughout the legi~lative process. 
40 
., 
Jan. 1969 
H.R. 3809 
O'Hara,D-MI 
• • 
.Provisions 
Sec. of HEW 
to conduct 
research 
and develop 
criteria for 
standards. 
Sec. of 
Labor to set 
and enforce 
standards. 
May 1969 
Aug. 1969 
H.R. 13373 
Ayres,R-OH 
• • Provisions 
Independent 
board to set 
and enforce 
standards. 
Mar. 1970 
H.R. 16785 
Daniels,D-NJ 
Provisions 
Similar to 
H.R. 3809 
plus a 
Sept. 1970 
H.R. 19200 
Steiger,R-WI 
• • ProvilS10DS 
Revision of 
H.R. 13373. 
general Standards to 
duty clause. be set by 
Numerous 
worker 
rights. 
independent 
board and 
enforced by 
independent 
• • commission. 
Sept. 1970 
=. 
• 
Nov. 1970 
House 
approves 
H.R. 19200 
over H.R. 
Dec. 1970 
16875. Conference 
Committee 
Bill 
Provisions 
Sec. of Labor 
to set and 
enforce 
standards. 
Independent 
commission for 
enforcement 
s. 2193 
Williams,D-NJ 
Aug. 1969 
s. 2788 
Javits,R-NY 
S •. 4 4 04 
Dominick,R-CO 
Nov. 1970 
Senate 
approves 
s. 2193 
• review. 
• • Prov1.s1.ons 
Similar to 
H.R. 3809. 
. \ 
Table 1.2. 
Source: 
• • Provisions 
Senate 
version of 
H.R. 13373 . 
I 
a I Provisions 
Senate 
version of 
H.R. 19200. 
• NIOSH 1n HEW. 
(committee 
bill 
similar to 
H.R. 16785, 
final bill 
includes 
Javits 
amendments) . 
Legislative History of th~ Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970. 
Adapted from Nicholas· Ashford, crisis in the Workplace: 
Occupational Disease and Injury, A R_eport to· the -~Ford .Foundat_Lon (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1976), pp; 54~55. 
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One argument\ involved whether the federal government should 
. ~ 
adopt established standards or develop new ones. This point 
'I 
was critical because standard-setting had often been subject 
to business influence, as previously discussed. A second 
debate was concerned with whether.promulgation of standards 
and enforcement powers should be concentrated within the same 
body, specifically, the Department of Labor. Both organized 
labor and busines~ agreed that the Labor Department would be 
more sympathetic to labor's interests. 53 Furthermore, argument 
over the imminent danger provision also continued throughout 
the legislative process. 
Business opposition resulted in the House Education and 
Labor Comittee' s reporting. a bill which limited the labor 
secretary's authority to promulgation of standards previously 
established by private organizations. 54 Even with this 
amendment, · industry continued to oppose the bill, and the 
Rules Committee would not clear it. 55 ·several analysts assert 
that the unions still did not support the bill wholeheartedly 
at this time. 56 Contributing to the demise of the bill was 
President Johnson's decision not to run for reelection amid ' 
53 • Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
54 Benjamin L. Brown, "A Law Is Made--The Legislative 
Process in ·the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970," · 
Labor Law Journal 25 (1974), p. 597. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Page and O'Brien, Bitter Wages, p. 141, in Ashford, p. 
53; Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Health," p. 241; Noble, 
p. 71. -
. . 
f 
the political turmoil of racial tensions and Vietnam. Here, 
one can observe a parallel to the Great Depression and World 
War II eras: other important national problems overshadowed 
occupational safety and health. 
Although industry thought that President Richard Nixon 
would be more sympathetic to its interests, the new 
administration continued the drive for a federal regulatory 
program. Because the issue was already on the federal policy 
agenda, and congressional activity concerning the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act sustained public interest in the 
?'issue, it would have been politically unwise for Nixon to 
withhold his support. 57 In addition, Nixon favored an 
occupational safety and health program for political motives 
similar to his predecessor's. Just as Johnson had attempted 
to use occupational safety and health to appease organized 
labor, Nixon used the issue as part of his attempt to lure 
blue-collar voters away from an increasingly divided 
Democratic Party. However, although Nixon could not table the 
program, he coul~ propose a regulatory scheme which favored 
business interests. 
Early in 1969, the Democrats introduced into the 91st 
Congress legislation similar to that which had died • 1n 
committee the previous year. Once again, Representative 
• " I I I t o 'Hara sponsored the maJ or version in the ~ouse, while Senator 
Harrison Williams (D-New Jersey) introduced a corresponding 
57 Noble, pp. 89-90. 
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bill into the Senate.. In August 1969, the admini_stration' s 
,> 
bill was introduced into the House by Representative William 
Ayres (R-Ohio) and into the Senate by Senator Jacob Javits (R-
f;, 
New York). Nixon's version differed substantially from the 
Democratic plan by vesting authority for setting and enforcing 
standards in a new National Occupational Safety arid Health 
Board, whose members were to be appointed by the president, 
rather than in the Secretary of Labor. As previously 
discussed,. remov.ing authority from the Department of Labor 
favored business interests. 
During 1969 and 1970, both the House and Senate Labor 
Subcommittees conducted hearings on occupational safety and 
health. Finally, organized labor as a whole supported the 
cause. As Kelman notes : "In 1969 occupational safety and 
health legislation became an important priority for AFL-CIO 
lobbyists. 1158 Labor backed O'Hara-Williams,· while business 
supported the President's proposals. 
In March 1970, Representative Dominick Daniels (D-New 
Jersey) introduced into the House a stronger version of the 
O'Hara bill which provided for more employee involvement in 
the regulatory process and included a general duty clause. 
With roots in common law, this clause provides broad 
protection to workers by stating that an employer has an 
obligation to provide a safe and healthful work environment 
apart from. specific standard~.__ In other words, an employer 
. -~ 
·.,.,,. 
58 Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Health," p. 241. 
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who meets .established standards is nevertheless held 
responsible.for failing to protect workers from hazards which 
~ . 
the standards do .not spec·ifically enumerate. The Daniels bill 
" 
was approved by the House Labor Committee in June 1970. 
In September 1970, another round of activity occurred in 
both houses. Representatives William Steiger (R~Wisconsin) 
and Robert Sikes (D-Florida) cosponsored a revised version of 
the Ayres bill in~the House. Although the Williams bill was 
reported out ·of committee in the Senate, Senator Peter 
Dominick (R-Colorado) introduced the Steiger version. The 
Steiger bill included .more worker protections--similar to 
those in the Daniels bill--than I previous administration 
proposals, but it further divided authority for the program. 
Standards were to be promul~~'ted by a National Occupational 
Safety and Health Board but ·enforced by an independent 
Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Commission. The Labor 
Department would share some enforcement responsibility through 
the inspection process. Again, it is important to note how 
this Republican division of authority would favor business 
interests. 
In November 1970, both houses approved final versions of 
their respective bills. The House passed the Steiger bill. 
The Senate approved a revised versiort of the Williams bill, 
similar to the Daniels bill in the House. The final version 
,. 
of the Senate bill also included amendments by Senator Javi ts. 
The Javits amendments provided a critical compromise: they 
45 
t 
created an independent three-member Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission to exercise final administrative 
review of enforcement cases, although both standard-setting 
'~ 
authority and initial enforcement authority remained with the 
s.ecretary of Labor. In addition, the Javits amendments 
. 
elevated the BOSH to National Institute status. The newly 
created National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) would be responsible for formulating and recommending 
safety and health standards to the Department of Labor. In 
sum, al though compromise characterized the bills in both 
houses, one can assert that the Senate's final • version 
reflected the proposals of Democrats and organized labor, 
while the House's final version manifested the reasoning of 
Republicans and management. 59 
In December 1970, a joint conference committee reconciled 
the two conflicting bills. . . ~ Organized labor played a vital 
role in the reconciliation process by exerting pressure on the 
committee regarding the standard-setting process. 60 Labor 
decided that the provision upon which it would not compromise 
was granting the Department of Labor authority to set 
standards so that they would not favor ,industrial interests. 
( 
In order to ensure the inclusion of this provision, labor 
communicated its willingness to compromise on other points to 
59 Ashford, p. 56. 
60 Page and O'Brien, Bitter Wages, p. 178, in Ashford, pp. 
56-57. 
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Senator Williams and Representative Carl Perkins (D-Kentuc.ky) , 
,. 
two Democratic members of the conference committee. 
Therefore, the conference committee adopted the Senate's 
provisions which granted the Secretary of Labor standard-
setting and initial enforcement authority, and the House's 
provisions which created an independent Occupational Safety 
and Health Review Commission to exercise final administrative 
reyiew of enforcement cases. Ironically, ''while [ the Act] has 
Steiger's name on· it, it contains almost none of his 
provisions. 1161 
The conference committee also retained the Javits 
proposal creating NIOSH. Thus, 
•.' ... s'" .. ,. 'f ' . = 
although the secretary of 
labor could immediately promulgate established standards, 
NIOSH would provide criteria for original standards in the 
future. Since the joint committee adopted most of the 
Senate's provisions, the Senate agreed to compromise upon the 
imminent danger provision. While the Senate version had 
allowed the secretary of labor to close down operations even 
if there was insufficient time to obtain a court order, the 
House required a court order in all cases. 
Finally, the Senate and House passed the conference bill 
on December 16 and December 17, respectively. On December 
29, 1970, President Nixon signed the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 into law. OSHA was created within the 
61 Noble, p. 93. 
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Department of Labor in 1971.~ 
An Evolution from Safety to Health 
This chapter has examined the development of U.S. 
occupational safety and health policy in general, although 
the topic of this thesis, toxic substance regulation, lies 
within the specific boundaries of occupational health policy. 
,. 
As previously stated, safety issues have been an obvious 
policy concern because their urgency can be readily measured 
using traditional data on industrial injuries. On the other 
hand, the limited availability of data on occupational health 
hazards has hindered attempts to increase awareness of the 
problem among professionals, labor, and the public. However, 
knowledge about occupational heal th hazards has expanded 
during the past twenty years. Indeed, health issues now seem 
to take priority over safety concerns at OSHA. 63 Thus, one 
might observe that a policy evolution from safety to health 
has occurred. 
62 Secretary of Labor's Order .,No. 12-71, 36 FR 8754 
( 1971) • 
63 Arthur J. Amchan, "The Future of OSHA,'' Labor Law 
Journal 35 (1984), pp. 547, 559. The author of this thesis 
wants to emphasize that safety problems are just as critical 
as heal th hazards. For example, a recent study . by the 
National Safe Workplace Institute, a private organization, 
reported that Americans are 30 times more likely to die from 
occupational injury: than swedes. The study also .reported that 
Japanese are twice' as safe on the job· as . American~ (c;arl 
. . . (' . . . . . ' . . . - . 
-Hartman, "U.S. workplace fatalities called higher than other 
nations'," The Morning Call [Allentown, PA], September 3, 
19·89, p. AJ). 
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Consequently, it is relevant to conclude· this chapter 
with a consideration of whether the historical foundations of 
i/' 
u. s. policy provide an adequate basis for current toxic 
substance regulation and its inherent problems. One variable 
· which measures the adequacy of the historical basis is the 
level of awareness of occupational health among participants 
in the adoption of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 and the early years of OSHA. 64 
Since the Act does contain specific provisions dealing 
with health hazards, one can assert that participants in the 
creation of the federal program must have had at least a 
minimal awareness of the importance of occupational health, 
despite the limited availability of data during the period. 
As previously discussed, one can note an emphasis on 
occupational health among those representatives of organized 
labor who allied with the environmental movement, such as Tony 
Mazzochi and his colleagues from the OCAW. 
However, as organized labor in gen~ral began to embrace 
occupational safety and health as an issue, it also became 
more aware of the importance of the health aspects of that 
issue. Kelman asserts: 
The impression here is that concern over 
industrial accidents, rather than 
exposure to
1
chemicals, dominated--though 
not overwhelmingly. Of the union 
representatives testifying at the 1968 
hearings, two stressed safety concerns, 
64 Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Health," pp. 242-43 
served as the impetus for this inquiry. 
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two ~:tressed heal th concerns, s,)and four 
stressed both about equally. 65 
Most important, the testimony of George Meany during the 19.,_68 
House hearings on 1ihe occupational safety and health bill 
contains extensive references to the importance of 
0 
occupational health. The following passage is illustrative: 
Every year thol.fsands of workers die slow, 
often agonizing dea~ from the effects 
of coal dust, asbe~os, beryllium, lead, 
cotton dust, carbon monoxide, cancer-
causing chemicals, dyes, radiation, 
pesticides., and exotic fuels. Others 
suffer long illnesses. Thousands suffer 
from employment in artificially created 
environments. 66 
Furthermore, in the following passage, Meany asserts that 
health hazards are as important as safety concerns: 
It makes little difference whether the 
hazard consists of· an unprotected 
elevator shaft in a building under 
construction, asbestos particles inhaled 
by a worker in the pipefitting industry, 
radon daughters gas drawn into the lungs 
o_f an underground miner or the unusual 
noise and vibration experienced every 
working day by thousands o.f heavy 
equipment operators. 67 
Moreover, in an article written in 1974, Benjamin Brown, 
then Deputy Under Secretary of Labor for Legislative Affairs, 
addresses the evolving focus from safety to health.~ He notes 
•, 
65 Ibid., p. 243. 
66 Statement of George Meany, House Hearings, 1968, p. 
704. 'lt ,, 
67 Ibid., p. 705. 
68 " Brown, "A Law Is Made. II 
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that William Steiger, one of the sponsors of occupational 
safety and health legislation, recognized the ~mportance of 
heal th concerns: "Steiger feels that the health aspect of 
OSHA will · take precedence over the safety factors. 1169 
Demofistrating considerable foresight, Brown continues: 
And his prediction is echoed by appeals 
to do something about the newly 
discovered harm to workers by carcinogens 
and vinyl and polyvinyl chloride ... And so 
here is a real test for administration of 
this law. Find a way under OSHA to 
regulate employee exposure to such 
substances as vinyl chloride without 
wiping out an industry and the worker's 
1 i vel ihood. 70 
In conclusion, there is evidence that participants in the 
adoption of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the 
early stages of OSHA were aware that heal th concerns were 
important and, perhaps, that an evolution from safety to 
heal th would occur. While this conclusion means that the 
historical foundations of U. s. policy provide an adequate 
basis for toxic substances regulation, it 
• is even more 
important to evaluate the subsequent development of the 
regulatory framework. This is the subject of Chapter II. 
-69 --Ibid., p. 606. 
70 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE 
TO TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
The amount of protection given to the 
laboring class is determined not by the 
number of labor laws upon the . statute 
books, but by the number of such laws 
which are properly administered, and by 
the extent to which their provisions are 
,actually enforced. 1 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
February 27, 1914 
Risk Assessment 
The foundation of the regulatory framework for 
occupational exposure to toxic substances is risk assessment. 
One can define this concept as the derivation of quantitative 
estimates of the heal th risks associated with toxic substances 
from scientific evidence. According to this definition, which 
is grounded in science·, risk assessment appears to be an 
objective process. However, because uncertainty characterizes 
the scientific procedures and · evidence upon which risk 
1 George Price, ''Administration of Labor Laws and Factory 
Inspection in Certain ·European Countries, '' Bulletin of · the ·· 
U.S. ·Bureau of Labor Statistics,· Feb. 27, 1914, p.,9, in David. 
Hemenway, Monitoring and Compliance: The Political Economy 
of Inspection (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Pr.ess, 1985), p. 80. 
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assessment relies, one concludes that the process is chiefly 
" 
subjective. In his discussion of scientific risk assessment, 
Steven Kelman comments: 
fr ,~, 
These days, most social scientists are 
trained to seek inspiration ·from the 
natural sciences and the canons of the 
scientific method. Social scientists 
frequently feel frustrated at the 
difficulties involved in applying the 
methods of the natural sciences to the 
testing of social science hypotheses. It 
would gratify some social scientists--and 
shock others--to learn just how 
frequently the application of the 
scientific method in the natural sciences 
runs into the same problems. 2 
Political and economic considerations can exercise much 
influence upon risk assessment because of its inherent 
scientific uncertainty. Accordingly, the author urges the 
reader to bear in mind a broad definition which encompasses 
scientific and technological elements as well as political and 
• • economic issues. Hence, this discussion will address the 
scientific issues involved in risk assessment and then relate 
those issues to policy decisions which have political and 
economic implications. 
The major scientific issue in risk assessment is the 
reliability of data on the health effects of 
issue is especially important in the 
exposure. This 
J 
Jr 
regulation of 
occupational carcinogens. OSHA has relied primarily upon 
epidemiolqgical evidence in setting standards for occupational 
2 Steven Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Heal th 
Administration, 11 in James Q •. Wilson, ed., The Politics of 
Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 19~9), p. 249. 
l ~ 
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carcinogens, but one must recognize the limitations inherent 
in these types of studies. 3 First, the long latency period of 
rt 
most occupational diseases hinders efforts to determine 
• 
precisely what levels of exposure workers experienced. As 
discussed in Chapter I, ignorance of occupational heal th 
hazards in previous years meant that such information was· 
neither monitored nor recorded. Moreover, researchers cannot 
determine all of the factors for which they should be 
controlling, such as other chemicals to which workers may have 
been exposed or lifestyle preferences. Finally, the sample 
of workers in epidemiological studies is usually small. 
OSHA has often used bioassays to support the 
epidemiological studies and, in some cases, as the primary 
source of evidence. 4 The basii assumption of the bioassay is 
that, if a substance produces health effects at high levels 
of exposure, it must have similar effects at lower levels of 
exposure. 5 Problems with this reasoning result from the two 
. ~ 
types of extrapolation it requires. First, researchers must 
extrapolate from high-dose to low-dose exposures. 6 In 
. 
addition, results must be extrapolated from animals to humans. 
Extrapolation from animals to humans manifests several 
3 John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance 
Regulation: How Overregulation Causes Underregulation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1988), p. 60. 
4 Ibid., pp. 60, 62. 
5 Ibid., p. 63. 
6 Ibid. 
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deficiencies. 7 " One problem is that some strains of animals 
v P 
may be more sensitive to certain toxic substances than others,· . 
so that it is difficult to determine which strains provide the 
best analogy to humans. Furthermore, the. method of 
administration is not the same for animals as for humans. 
For example, animals may be exposed to a. substance through 
feeding, while humans are exposed to it through inhalation. 
Moreover, it is difficult to determine which factor to use for 
the extrapolation. Researchers must choose between body 
1~ 
weight, surface area of body, or some other factor. Finally, 
there is uncertainty about whether the metabolism of toxic 
substances in test animals is comparable to human metabolism. 
{ 
i The uncertainty surrounding scientific evidence on risk, 
such as epidemiological and bioassay studies, leaves a void 
(} 
which OSHA must fill by making policy decisions. Three 
examples demonstrate this assertion. First, one basic policy 
decision which OSHA made during the 1970s was to consider 
strong evidence of cancer 1' in laboratory animals as 
representing probability of cancer in humans. 8 
Another policy decision involves the concept of dose-
response, which Steven Kelman explains as follows: 
In large enough doses, any chemical--
table salt, water, milk--will harm the 
body •••• Conversely, below certain doses, 
humans will survive contact with cyanide 
gas or hemlock, and not be the worse for 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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wear. The dose of a chemicai below which 
no toxic response is produced is called 
a·"threshold" or "no-effect" dose. 9 
Again, during the 1970s, the agenc_y adopted the position that 
no exposure level for carcinogens is entirely risk free except 
zero. 10 In regulatory language·, this policy states: 
No determination will be made that a 
''threshold'' or "no-effect'' level of 
exposure can be established for a human 
population exposed to carcinogens in 
general, or to any specific substance, 29 
CFR Sec. 19-90.143(h) (1987). 
A third example concerns a policy decision related to 
technology. To achieve technological compliance with health 
standards, OSHA favors the use of engineering controls rather 
than personal protective equipment, such as respirators. 
While business has vehemently criticized this policy decision 
because it results in high compliance costs, Kelman notes that 
this decision does have a sound factual basis from a 
regulatory perspective: "Once engineering controls have been 
installed, the problem is basically solved. 1111 In contrast, 
while personal protective equipment is certainly less 
expensive for employers, employees often resist wearing it 
because it is uncomfortable and interferes with their job 
performance. 
• et From these examples, one can conclude that a philosophy 
9 Kelman, ,, ' 
. 
''Occupational Safety and Heal th,'' p. 237. 
" 10 Mendeloff, p. 63. 
11 Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Health, II p. 251. 
' 
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of • maximum worke~ protecticin has guided OSHA's policy 
decisions. While organized labor certainly agrees with this 
l 
philosophy, Kelman asserts that a more important.contributing 
. 
factor is the pro-protection ideology of the occupational 
safety and health profession. 12 Spec.ifically, he.discusses how 
occupational safety and health professionals are inculcated 
with pro-protection values in their training. " When members 
of the profession become OSHA officials, they translate these 
values into policy. Furthermore, OSHA's organizational 
mission, which it derives from the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, is clearly to protect workers. This sense of 
mission bolsters the acceptance of the pro-protection 
philosophy. 13 
Throughout the early history of the agency, business 
.i;,, 
interests unsuccessfully argued against this philosophy on 
the basis of exorbitantfcompliance costs, as mentioned above. 
However, the current trend toward deregulation and the 
increased emphasis on fiscal restraint and cost considerations 
\ 
in government have provided an atmosphere in which policy 
makers give such arguments more credence. 
For instance, cost-benefit analysis has received an 
increasing amount of attention. This type of analysis 
involves comparing the costs of a proposed regulatory activity l ' 
,, )<-~\. 
with its potential benefits. Estimating the costs of a 
12 Ibid., pp. 250-53. 
13 • Ibid., p. 253. 
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proposed occupational health standard is not an easy~task, but 
it can be accomplished with some degree of accuracy. 
How does one measure the potential benefits? The 
comments of Dr. Morton Corn, former President Gerald Ford's 
Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, are 
instructive: 
After arriving at OSHA, I engaged in an 
in-depth consideration of cost-benefit 
analysis, applying the methodology to the 
coke-oven standard ..•. With the dose-
response data at our disposal, various 
assumptions were used to ring in changes 
on different methodologies for estimating 
benef_i ts. The range in values arrived 
at, based on the different assumptions, 
was so wide as to be virtually useless. 
The conclusion I reached after this 
exercise was that the methodology , of 
cost-benefit analysis for disease and 
death effects is very preliminary, and 
one can almost derive any desired 
answer. 14 
The concept of cost-benefit analysis will be a recurring theme 
throughout this thesis. 
In sum, the uncertainty which • is inherent in tpe 
scientific aspects of risk assessment means that the procedure 
does not serve as an objective foundation for the regulation 
of occupational exposure to toxic substances. Rather, risk 
assessment involves many subjective decisions, which foster 
opportunities for political and economic considerations to 
14 Charl~s Noble, Liberalism a_t Work: The Rise and Fall 
of OSHA (Phiiadelphia: Temple· University Press, 1986), · p. 
113, citing Jacqueline Karnell Corn and Mo,rton Corn, ''The Myth 
-and the Reality, " in Robert F. Lanz il lot ti, ed. , Ec.onomic 
• • • • • • •• Effects of Government-Mandated Costs (Gainesville: University 
Presses of Florida, 1977), p. 106. 
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influence the regulatory process at this fundamental level. 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the data used in 
risk assessment, the key to influencing the regulatory process 
is how groups present scientific information, with • • 1.ts 
economic implic'ations, to policy makers. Although the 
presentation of information is critical to successful lobbying 
in any area of policy, groups attempting to in{luence a policy 
beset by scientific uncertainty enjoy even more opportunities 
to manipulate data to their advantage. Furthermore, those 
groups which succeed in manipulating data attempt to 
legitimate the manipulation with claims of scientific 
objectivity. 
Accordingly, one must note that OSHA and NIOSH, the 
•I 
occupational safety and health research institute within the 
Department of Health and Human Services, rely chiefly upon 
data from external sources. This thesis will subsequently 
demonstrate that, as Jeffrey Berry asserts: 
A communication itself does not have to 
be overtly persuasive in nature; it can 
be technical information or a research 
report. It is the inferred intent of the 
communicator that is crucial to the 
definition ( of lobbying]. 15 
However, one must first gain a clear understanding of the 
legal framework for the regulation of occupational exposure 
to toxic substances since this framework defines the channels 
through which interests ·can convey inf orinatio~. 
15 Jeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying for the People (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.), p. 11. 
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Promulgation of Standards 
., 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act provides three 
methods for setting health and safety standards, 29 U.S.C.A. 
Sec. 655 (1985) . 16 First, within two years after the effective 
date of the Act, OSHA could promulgate any existing federal 
standard or national consensus standard as a final health or 
safety standard, 29 U.S~C.A. Sec. 655(a) (1985). The statute 
defines a national consensus standard as follows: 
•.. any occupational safety and health 
standard or modification thereof which ,'y 
(1), h~s been adopted and promulgated by 
a nationally recognized standard-
producing organization under procedures 
whereby it can - be determined by the 
Secretary [of Labor] that persons 
interested and affected by the scope or 
provisions of the standard have reached 
substantial agreement on its adoption, 
( 2) was formulated in a manner which 
afforded an opportunity for diverse views 
to be considered and (3) has been 
designated as such a standard by the 
Secretary, after consultation with other 
appropriate Federal agencies, 29 U.S.C.A. 
Sec. 652(9) (1985). 
At this point, one should recall from Chapter I the 
discussion of OSHA' s adoption of stand~rds established by ANSI 
and, more important, ACGIH, the association of industrial 
hygienists employed by the government. The ACGIH had 
established threshold limit values (TLVs) for many toxic 
16 
.one should recall from Chapter I that Secr,etary of 
Labor's Order No. 12-71,. 36 FR 8754 (1971), deleg~tes ~he 
secretary's statuto.ry responsibilities to OSHA. Thus, one 
should interpret referenees to the Secretary of Labor to mean 
OSHA. 
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substances. These limits are "the concentrations of a 
substance to which most workers can be exposed in an average 
workday without adverse effects. 1117 In 1969 the federal 
government had adopted the TLVs for 400 substances as 
standards under the Walsh-Healey Act, 18 which regulates working 
conditions on public contracts, as discussed in Chapter I. 
On May 29, 1971, OSHA promulgated these TLVs. 19 
In addition, the Act outlines a permanent standard-
setting process. For health standards, this process often 
begins with NIOSH. The Occupational Safety and Health Act 
created NIOSH to "develop and establish recommended 
occupational safety and health standards," 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 
671(c) (1) (1985). Furthermore, the Act states that,· through 
NIOSH: 
The Secretary of Health and Human 
Services shall from time to time consult 
with the Secretary [of Labor] in order to 
develop specific plans for such research, 
demonstrations, and experiments as are 
necessary to produce criteria, including 
criteria identifying toxic substances, 
enabling the Secretary to meet his 
responsibility for the formulation of 
safety and heal th standards under this 
chapter, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 669(a) (2) 
(1985). 
Specifically, NIOSH produces a criteria document 
containing its formal recommendations for a standard to 
17 Norman J. Wood, "Environmental Law and Occupational 
Health,'' Labor Law Journal 27 (1976), p. 156. 
18 34 FR 7946 (1969). 
19 36 FR 10503 (1971) • 
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fulfill these responsibilities. 20 More accessible to the 
layman is NIOSH's Gurrent Intelligence Bulletin {CIB), an 
informa"l document ''without regulatory significance. 1121 
Designed for public dissemination, the CIB for a toxic 
substance summarizes existing scientific research and~}OSH's 
recommendation, if ~one has been made.·· 
OSHA may appoint an advisory committee to produce a draft 
for a recommended standard, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 65,G(b) (1985). 
The statute states that an advisory committee must include an 
equal number of representatives of business and labor, as well 
as other qualified individuals, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 656(b) 
(1985). All advisory committee meetings must be open to the 
public and the records of such meetings must also be available 
to the public, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 656(b) (1985). 
The Act establishes a hybrid rule making.procedure which 
allows both written comment and limited oral participation. 
OSHA must publish in the Federal Register any proposed rule 
which promulgates, modifies, or revokes a health or safety 
standard, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 655(b) (2) (1985). During a period 
of thirty days after publication, interested parties may 
submit written data or comment, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 655(b) (2) 
(1985), or file written objections and request a public 
hearing on~those objections, 29 u.s.c.A .. Sec. 655(b)(3) 
'il 
2° Kelman~ "Occupational Safety and Health," p. 244. 
21 National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, 
Formaldehyde: Evidence of . Carcinogenicity, Current 
Intelligence Bulletin 34, April 15, 1981. 
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(1985). OSHA must then, publish a notice of the hearing in the 
Federal Register, 29 u.s.c.A. Sec. 655(b) (3) (1985). 
~· 
Hearings provide an ideal forum in which interest groups 
can present their information. Kelman observes: "A good deal 
of the testimony is presented by organizations. 1122 He cites 
frequent participation by the AFL-CJO, National Association 
of Manufacturers, trade associations for specific industries, 
and Ralph Nader's Health Research Group. 23 
Within sixty days after the expiration ·of the period for 
written comment or the completion of a hearing, OSHA must 
issue its final rule or determine that a rule should not be 
issued, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 655(b) (4) (1985). The rule may 
contain a provision delaying the effective date up to ninety 
days so that employers and employees can familiarize 
themselves with the new requirements, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 
655(b)(4) (1985). 
In the third method of promulgation, the statute allows 
interested parties to petition OSHA for 1 the promulgation of 
an emergency temporary standard (ETS), 29 u.s.c.A. Sec. 655(c) 
(1985). Organized labor is generally the source of this type 
of petition. 24 
(J' 
An ETS takes effect immediately upon 
publication in the Federal Register if OSHA,v determines that 
employees are exposed to grave danger from which they can be 
22 Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Health," p. 245. 
23 , Ibid. 
24 • Ibid., p. 244. 
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protected only through an ETS, 29 u.s.c.A. Sec. 655 (c) (1) 
(1985) ,• Publication of the ETS serves as the proposed rule 
for a permanent standard, which OSHA must promulgate within 
six months, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 655(c) (3) (1985). 
The most important statutory requirement to which 
standards for toxic substances must conform is the following 
I I provision: 
The Secretary [of Labor], in promulgating .. 
standards dealing with toxic materials or 
harmful physical agents under this 
subsection, shall set the standard which 
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the b~~is of the best 
available evidence, that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health or 
functional capacity even if such employee 
has regular exposure to the hazard dealt 
with by such standard for the period of 
his working life, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 
655(b) (5) (1985) (emphasis added]. 
Because it is the point at which all factors--scientific, 
technical, political, and economic--converge, this provision 
is the major source of contention over heal th standards .. 
Should OSHA define to the extent feasible in terms of maximum 
worker protection, economics, or other guidelines? 
As the final section of this _chapter will demonstrate, 
judicial review is one method for dealing with the feasibility 
question. Accordingly, the courts often • impose further 
constraints upon standard-setting. For example, the Supreme 
Court's invalidation of the benzene standard requires OSHA to 
demonstrate quantitatively that a toxic substance· poses a 
significant risk of harm to employees. 
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Additional • economic feasibility requirements have 
originated from presidential attempts to reform regulatory 
policy· during the 1970s and 1980s. For example, the 
.. 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub.L. 96-354, Sept. 19, 
1980, 94 stat. 1164, 5 u.s.c.A. Sec. 601 et seq. (1989), is 
the legislative version of one of President Jimmy Carter's 
attempts at regulatory reform. 25 According to this Act, OSHA 
must determine the extent of a standard's impact on small 
businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and governmental 
jurisdictions by preparing Regulatory Flexibility Analyses for-. 
both proposed and final rules, 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 603, 604 
(1989). 
More important, President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order 
No. 12291 of 198126 requires review of all proposed and final 
rules by the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) . The 
executive order states: "Regulatory action shall not be 
undertaken unless t·he potential benefits to· society .for the 
regulation outweigh the potential costs to society. 1127 
Consequently, for each proposed standard, OSHA must present 
to~ 0MB a Regulatory Impact Analysis, which includes cost-
benefit analysis. The executive order also states that an 
25 U. s. Congress, Senate, Judiciary Commi ttee--Regulatory 
Flexibility Act of 1980, S. Rep. No. 96-878, 96th Cong., 2nd 
sess., reprinted,__ in 1980 U.S. Code Congressional & 
Administrative News 4, p. 2788. 
26 46 FR 13193 ( 1981) • 
27 Exec. Order No. 12291, Sec. 2(b) (1981). 
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agency can combine the flexibility and impact analyses in 
order to ease its administrative burden. 
'> A fin~l ~-~irement for health standards is imposed by 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub.L. 91-190, 
Jan. 1, 1970, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 4321 et 
seq. (1989), and related executive orders. According to these 
provisions, OSHA must determine·how compliance with a health 
standard will affect the environment. 
After reviewing OSHA' s standard-setting process, one will 
probably agree with Kelman' s succinct observation: "OSHA 
promulgates regulations after a process that is Byzantine in 
its com·plexi ty. 1128 
Overview of Standard-Setting Activity 
Appendix II provides a chronology of standard-setting 
activity for toxic substances. From the chronology, one 
observes that the complexity of standard-setting results in 
·"· 
slow promulgation. For example, although the ACGIH continued 
to lower its exposure levels,~ OSHA did not modify the limits 
which it adopted from that organization in 1971 until January 
1989. The agency published a final rule for air contaminants 
which lowered the permissible exposure limits (PELs) for 212 
substances and established new PELs for 164 substances which 
the agency had not previously regulated. 
28 Kelman, "Occupational Safety and Health," p. 244. 
29 Mendeloff, p. 107. 
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One can also observe from the appendix that the year 1978 
provides an exception· to the generally slow pace of 
' . 
promulgation. ,_ This development was the result of President 
Carter .. ' s appointment of Dr. Eula Bingham as Assistant 
""" " Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health. Charles Noble 
comments about Bingham's leadership: 
In general, Carter appointees to the 
sgcial regulatory agencies ·were 
sympathetic to the demands of· organized 
labor and the consumer and environmental 
movements ••.• Dr. Bingham fit this mold. 
A public health professor and activist, 
she was strongly committed to changing 
the agency's direction. For her there 
was still a crisis at the workplace, and 
OSHA had to confront it.· Workers were 
faced, she maintained, with a "national 
environmental tragedy'' on the job. 30 
Accordingly, Bingham advocated a new approach to expedite the 
pace of standard-setting, especially for heal th hazards. This 
technique involved the promulgation of broad, • generic 
standards, whereas OSHA had -previously issued standards only 
for specific toxic substances. 
The culmination of the new approach was the promulgation 
of the Cancer Policy, ·29 CFR Sec. 1990.101 et seq. (1987), in 
1980. OSHA designed the Policy to resolve the general issues 
involved in the identification, classification, and regulation 
of potential carcinogens. As previously discussed, the cancer 
• 
Policy clarifies policy decisions concerning scientific and 
'I\\,.. 
technological issues, such ~s threshold levels, extrapolation 
30 Noble, p. 188. 
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from animals to humans, and engineering controls. 
includes model standards for potential carcinogens. 
~ 
It also 
However, the Policy has never fulfilled.its mission as(\ 
envisioned by OSHA under Bingham's leadership. For instance, 
while the original version included references to the lowest 
feasible level of exposure, the Supreme Court's invalidation 
of the benzene standard forced the agency to remove this 
language. 3;1 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the advent of the 
' 
Reagan Administration signaled an intensification of the trend 
toward deregulation. The Cancer Policy is only one example 
which demonstrates that OSHA provided no exception to this 
trend. Under the leadership of Thorne Auchter, the agency 
stayed the development of regulatory candidate and priority 
lists. 32 These lists were designed to serve as the key 
mechanisms by which OSHA could expedite the promulgation of 
standards for potential carcinogens. 
Despite the problems of implementation associated with 
the Cancer Policy and other generic standards, 33 one cannot 
. ·~ . 
conclude that the agency has completely dispensed with the 
generic approach. For instance, to justify its activity on 
• 
31 At 46 FR 5881 (1981), OSHA stated: "No a~tomatic 
se~ting of exposures at the lowest feasible level will occur." 
32 47 FR 187 (1982) and 48 FR 243 (1983). 
33 The reader is referred to Appendices II and III for 
discussion of the hazard communication standard and the 
requirements for access to employee exposure and medical 
records. · 
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air contaminants, the agency st~ted: 
OSHA has focused its past priorities· on 
the development of detailed and. broad 
regulations for some high priority 
substances •• ~.OSHA determined that it was 
necessary to modify,this approach through 
the use of generic rulemaking,. which 
would simultaneously cover many 
substances •••• Without a generic approach 
OSHA would not be able to provide the 
~ level of health protection required for 
many work situations.~ 
Inspection, Enforcement, and the OSHRC 
Although this thesis focuses upon the promulgation of 
health standards regulating toxic substances, it is relevant 
briefly to discuss the provisions of the Occupational Safety 
l 
and Health Act which deal with inspection, enforcement, and 
initial adjudication. The Act states that, after 
"presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, 
or ag_ent in charge, " OSHA has the authority to enter 
workplaces "without delay and at reasonable times," 29 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 657(a) (1) (1985). Most inspections are routine; 
OSHA formulates a timetable of periodic inspections based upon 
various factors, including the agency's determination of how 
hazardous is a particular industrial sector or operation. 35 
However, the statute also allows employees or their 
representatives to request in writing a special inspection if 
' 
j: 34 . 5 4 FR 2 3 3 3 ( 19 ~ 9 ) . 
35 Len Brown, OSHA District Office, Allentown, PA,· 
interview with author, April 5, 1989. 
69 
they believe ''that a violation of a sa·fety or heal th standard 
exists that threatens physical harm, or that an imminent 
danger exists," 29 u.s.c.A. Sec. 657(f) (1) (1985). The most 
important limitation upon OSHA's powers of inspection results 
from the Supreme Court's decision in Marshall . v. Barlow's 
..... 
Inc., 436 u.s. 307, 98 s.ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), 
which holds that an employer can require the agency to obtain 
. 
a search warrant in order to enter his establishment. 
When an inspector determines that an employer is in 
violation of the law, the Act grants him the authority to 
issue a written citation, which must describe the nature of 
the particular violation and refer to the specific provision 
of the "chapter, standard,·d rule, regulation, or order alleged 
to have been violated," 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 658(a) (1985). In 
addition, the citation must include "a reasonable time for the 
abatement of the violation," 29 u.s.c.A. Sec. 658(a) (1985). 
Furthermore, "within a reasonable time after the 
termination of I the] inspection or investigation, '' OSHA must " 
notify the employer by certified .mail of the penalty to be 
assessed, 29 U,S.C.A. Sec. 659(a), (1985). An employer has 
fifteen working days from the receipt of this notice to inform 
OSHA of his intent to contest a citation and proposeg penalty, 
29 u.s.c.A. Sec. 659(a) '(1985). If he does not contest, the 
citation and penalty become the final order of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), 29 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 659(a) (1985). 
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The OSHRC is an independent commission established by the, 
Act for the initial adjudication of contested violations, 29 
·u.s.c~.A. Sec. 661(a) (1985). It is composed of three members 
who are appointed by the president with Senate approval; 
members serve six-year terms, which are staggered, 2 9 U. s. C. A. 
Sec. 661 (a) , (b) (1985). The Commission appoints 
administrative law judges (ALJs) to hear proceedings, 29 
u.s.c.A. Sec. 661(j) (1985). The report of an ALJ becomes the 
final order of the OSHRC within thirty days unles,_f.a 
Commission member requests that the Commission review it, 29 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 661(j) (.1985). 
Judicial Review of Standards 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act provides for .two 
types of judicial review. First, enforcement review occurs 
when "any person adversely affected or aggrieved on an order 
of the Commission" obtains review of that order by the court 
'l 
of appeals, 29 u.s.c.A. sec. 660(a) (1985). OSHA may also 
obtain review or enforcement of a final order of the OSHRC in 
the court of appeals, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 660(b) (1985). 
In addition, the Act also provides for preenforcement 
review of an ETS or permanent standard by the court of 
appeals: 
( 
Any person who may be adversely affected 
by a standard issued under this section 
may at any time prior to the .s_ixtieth day. 
after such standard is.promulgated file 
a petition c;hallenging the validity . of 
such standard with the United· States 
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court.of appeals~ 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6S5(f) 
( 1985) • 
The most important statutory requirement for preenforcement 
review is the substantial evidence test: 
The determinations of the Secretary [of 
Labor] shall be conclusive if supported 
by substantial evidence in the record 
considered as a whole, 29 u.s.c.A. Sec. 
655(f) (1985) [emphasis added]. 
Preenforcement review is significant to this thesis 
because it deals with questions of feasibility. Accordingly, 
one must recall that the fundamental requirement with which 
standards for toxic substances must comply is to the extent 
feasible. 
Appendix III summariz·es various preenforcement review 
cases involving both emergency and permanent standards. This 
author asserts that three key cases have determined the 
framework of preenforcement review. These three cases dealt 
with permanent standards. One of these cases, Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 
1 
1974), involved preenforcement review of the first permanent 
standard, asbestos. In examining this • • opinion, it • lS 
important to note that the court which reviewed this case had 
the difficult task of providing the first definition of the 
appropriate role of the judiciary in shaping occupational 
health policy. 
The court focused upon how, OSHA' s hybrid rulemaking 
. - . 
procedure and the uncertainty of the scientifici data used.in 
promulgation hinder the application of the Act's substantial 
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evidence requirement, which necessitates a strict standard of 
' 
judicial review. The court determined that, OSHA's standard-
setting activity is both adjudicatory .and legislative. The 
agency's resolution of the facts in the record comprises the 
adjudicatory component of promulgation, but at the same time, 
the uncertainty of the scientific data necessitates policy 
decisions which are legislative in nature. Thus, a court can 
review the adjudicatory aspects of promulgation by determining 
whether the record substantially supports OSHA's decisions, 
but it must recall that: 
' . 
... some of the questions involved in the 
promulgation of these standards are on 
the frontiers of scientific knowledge, 
and consequently as to them insufficient 
data is presently available to make a 
fully informed factual determination. 
Decision making must in that circumstance 
depend to a greater extent upon policy 
judgments and less upon purely factual 
analysis, 499 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
[emphasis added]. 
Furthermore, the court continued: 
Thus, in addition to currently unresolved 
factual issues, the formulation of 
standards involves choices that by their 
nature. require basic policy 
determinations rather than resolution of 
factual controversies. Judicial review 
of inherently legislative decisions of 
this sort is obviously an undertaking of 
different dimensions, 499 F.2d 475 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974). 
Under these circumstances, a reviewing court must be 
-, 
flexible, 499 F.2d 475, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1974), but flexibility 
does not necessarily result in more lenient review. The court 
cited the following passage from one~of its previous opiriions: 
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This exercise- need be no less searching 
and strict in its weighing of whether the 
. 
. . . ~ 
agency has performed in accordance with 
the Congressional purposes, but, bec~use 
it is addressed to different materials, 
it inevitably varies from the 
adjudicatory model. The paramount 
· objective is to see whether the agency, 
given an essentially legislative task to 
perform, has carried it out in a manner 
calculated to negate the dangers of 
arbitrariness and irrationality in the 
formulation of rules for general 
application in the future, Automotive 
· · Parts & Accessories Ass 'n v. Boyd, 4 07 
F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cited at 
499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
However, one can generally conclude that the court in 
Hodgson granted 'OSHA discretion in promulgation. The court 
upheld most of the asbestos requirements and stated: 
All of the challenged features of the 
standards appear to, p~rtake of an 
essentially legislative type of decision 
making by the Secretary [of Labor] in the 
performance of the broad delegation made 
to him by Congress. Had any one of these 
decisions been made in the first instance 
by Congress itself and embodied in the · 
statute, its vulnerability to judicial 
scrutiny would have been dubious indeed. 
In this context, therefore, judicial 
review inevitably runs the risk of 
~ becoming arbitrary supervision and 
revision of the Secretary's efforts to · 
effectuate the legislative purposes in an 
area where variant responses might each 
be legitimate in the sight of Congress, 
499 F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
In addition to defining judicial review of standards, the 
court also discusses economic feasibility. It determines that 
() 
"the factors entering into [OSHA's] conclusion could properly 
include problems of· economic feasibility;" 499 F.2d 477 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) . · After examining the legisl_ative history of the 
74 
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Occupational Safety and Health Act, the court states that "it 
would comport with common usage to say that a standard that 
is prohibitively expensive is not 'feasible,'" 499 F .. 2d 4 77 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Thus, the court continues: 
Congress does not appear to have intended 
to protect employees by putting their 
employers out of business--either by 
requiring protective devices unavailable 
under existing technology or by making 
financial viability generally impossible, 
499 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
However, the court qualifies this discussion with the 
following statement: 
This qualification is not intended to 
provide a route by which recalcitrant 
employers or industries may avoid the 
reforms contemplated by the Act. 
Standards may be economically feasible 
even though, from the standpoint of 
employers, they are financially 
burdensome and a~fect profit margins 
adversely. Nor does the concept of 
economic feasibility necessarily 
guarantee the continued existence of 
individual employers. It would appear to 
be consistent with the purposes of the 
Act to envisage the economic demise of an 
employer who has lagged behind the rest 
of the industry i~ protecting the health 
and safety of employe~s and is 
consequently financially unable to comply 
with new standards as quickly as other 
employerg, 499· F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
Again, just as in its discussion of judicial review, the court 
seems to grant OSHA discretion in the ·promulgation· of 
"' standards. 
In addition to Hodgson, two Supreme Court decisions are 
critical to preenforcement review of standards: Industrial 
' 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 
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u.s. 607, 100 s.ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 {1980), or the , 
Benzene decision, and American Textile Manufacturers Institute 
v. Donovan, 452 u.s. 490, 101 s.ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 
(1981), or the Cotton Dust case. 
The Benzene decision was an appeal of American Petroleum 
Institute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), in which the 
court of appeals vacated OSHA's benzene standard. Regulating 
'1 
benzene as a carcinogen, the new standard would have reduced 
the PEL from 10 ppm to 1 ppm. Instead of basing its deci,sion 
upon the feasibility language in the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, the court relied upon "a hitherto little-regarded 
and unnoticed statutory provision1136 from the definitions in 
the Act: 
The term "occupational safety and health 
standard" means a standard which requires 
conditions, or the adoption or use of one 
or more practices, means, methods, 
operations, or processes, reasonably 
necessary or appropriate to provide safe 
or healthful employment and places of 
employment, 29 u.s.c.A. Sec. 652(8) 
(1985) [emphasis added]. 
Hence, the court determined that this language imposes upon 
promulgation a reasonable relationship test, 
37 according to 
which OSHA must balance its analysis of costs with a similar 
analysis of benefits. In other words, the court held that 
the agency must perform cost-benefit analysis. OSHA's 
36 Charles Tiefer, "OSHA' s Tqxics Program Faces a Supreme 
Court.Test," Labor Law Journal 30\ (1979), p. 683. 
37 Ibid. 
/ 
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promulgation of the benzene standard failed this test because 
the agency merely stated in its rqlemkaing: 
Having determined that the benefits of 
the proposed standard are likel.y to be 
appreciable, OSHA. is not obligated to 
carry out further exercises toward more 
precise calculations of benefit which 
would not significantly clarify the 
ultimate decision. 38 
Drawing a parallel between the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC) and OSHA, 581 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1978), the 
court of appeals concluded: 
Although the agency does not have to 
conduct an elaborate cost-benefit 
analysis, it does have to determine 
whether the benefits expected from the 
standard bear a reasonable relationship 
to the costs imposed by the standard, 581 
F.2d 503 (5th Cir. · 1978), citing Aqua 
Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, 569 F.2d 840, 842 (5th 
Cir. 1978). 
The Supreme Court was extremely divided in the Benzene 
case. A plurality opinion was written by Justice Stevens, 
who was joined by Chief Justice Burger .and Justice Stewart. 
Stevens stated that the plurality did not reach the issue of 
the lower court's cost-benefit requirement because OSHA had 
not determined the threshold question--whether or not the 
substance posed a significant risk of cancer: 
It is the Agency's responsibility to 
determine, in the first instance, what it 
considers to be a ''significant'' risk. 
Some risks are plainly acceptable and 
others are plainly unacceptable. If, for· 
example, the odds are one in a bill-ion 
38 43 FR 5941 (1978) [emphasis added]. j 
~ t .• 
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that a person will die from cancer by 
taking a drink of chlorinated water, the 
risk clearly could not be considered 
significant. On the other hand, if the 
odds are one in a thousand that regular 
inhalation of gasoline vapors that are 2% 
benzene will be fatal, a reasonable 
. ·~ person might well consider the risk 
significant and take appropriate steps to 
decrease or eliminate it, 448 U.S. 655, 
65 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1980). 
Again, one must recall that OSHA had merely stated that the 
benefits of the standard were ''likely to be appreciable." 
Peter F. Stone argues that the plurality's rejection of 
-· . 
"appreciable'' risk stemmed from OSHA's lack of 
quantification. 39 However, the Court did qualify its comments 
about the quantification of significant risk by stating that 
"the requirement is not a mathematical straightjacket," 448 
U.S. 655, 65 L,.Ed.2d 1043 (198'0). Furthermore, the Court 
continued: "OSHA is not required to support its findings that 
significant risk exists with anything approaching scientific 
certainty," 448 U.S. 656, 65 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1980). Citing 
Hodgson, the Court stated that a reviewing court must· "give 
OSHA some leeway where its fi"ndings must be made on the 
frontiers of scientific knowledge," 448 U.S. 656, 65 L.Ed.2d 
1043 (1980). Finally, the Court asserted: 
Thus, so long at they are supported by a 
body of reputable scientific thought, the 
Agency is free to use conservative 
assumptions in interpreting the data with 
39 Peter F. stone, "The Significant Risk Requirement in 
OSHA Regulation of Carcinogens: Industrial Union-Department, 
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum.Institute," Stanford Law Review 
33 (1981), p. 560. _ 
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respect to carcinogens, ~isking error on 
the side of overprotection rather than 
underprotection, 44··a u. s. 656-57, 65 
L.Ed.2d 1043-44 (~980). 
However, despite these reassurances by the plurality, one can 
conclude that the net effect of Benzene was the imposition of 
restraints upon OSHA's standard-setting process • 
... 
In order to demonstrate the diversity of views among the 
., 
justices, it is relevant to discuss briefly the Court's other 
opinions. Two distinct concurring opinions were written by 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Powell would have upheld the 
lower court's cost-benefit requirement, while Rehnquist would 
have held that the to the extent feasible language of the 
Occupational Safety and Heal th Act is an unconstitutional 
• 
delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. 
Finally, the dissenting I I opinion was written by Justice 
Marshall and joined by Justices Brennan, White! and Blackmun. 
The dissenters would have upheld the standard because it met .. 
the substantial evidence test. 
Unlike benzene, cotton dust is not a carcinogen, but 
exposure can cause a respiratory disease known as byssinosis, 
) or "brown lung" disease. Al though · OSHA did not perform a 
cost-benefit analysis in its rulemaking, it did make threshold 
determinations which had been lacking in the rulemaking for 
benzene. 40 Specifically, OSHA found that exposure to cotton 
1.d 
40 Joseph E. Hadley, Jr. and Gerald L. Richman, 0 The 
Impact Of B~nzene and cotton Dust: Restraints On The 
Regulation Of Toxic Substances," Administrative Law Review 34 
( 19 8 2 ) , p . 6 5 • ., 
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dust at the existing PEL posed a ''significant health hazard 
I 
to employees"41 and that the new standard would significantly 
reduce the prevalence of byssinosis. 42 Thus, because the 
' 
agency made these th.reshold determinations, the issue of cost-, 
benef·i t analysis was ripe when the case later reached the 
Supreme Court. 43 
Cotton Dust was an appeal of AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 
F. 2d Cir. which the • maJor affirmed (D.C. 1979), 636 
requirements of the cotton dust standard for the textile 
• 
industry. In sharp contrast to the Fifth Circuit's decision 
regarding benzene, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia (D.C.) Circuit held that the reasonably necessary or 
appropriate definition of a standard does not require a cost-
benefit analysis for toxic substances. Rather, Congress 
intended the regulation of toxic substances to be subject only 
to limits of feasibility. The court stated: 
41 
42 
43 
OSHA argues that the [Occupational Safety 
and Health Act] constrains the regulation 
of dangerous substances ''only by limits 
of feasibility.'' We agree. We also find 
that no additional constraint is imposed 
by the Act's definition of a heal th or 
safety standard as "reasonably necessary 
or appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment. " The language of 
the Act and the clear intention of 
Congress permit no other conclusion, 617 
F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
Ibid., citing 43 FR 27350 (1978). 
Ibid. , citing 43 FR 27359 (1978). 
Ibid., pp. 65-66 •. 
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While the Supreme Court's reasoning in Benzene differed 
from that of the Fifth Circuit, the· court in Cotton Dus
t 
affihned the logic of the Court of Appeals for the o.c
. 
Circuit. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion,-· joined 
by Justices White, Marshall, Black.mun, and Stevens. Th
e 
majority relied.upon the dictionary definition of feasible as 
"capable of being done," 452 U.S. 508-10, 69 L.Ed.2d 201-02
 
(1981). Joseph E. Hadley, Jr. and Gerald L. Richman assert 
that this technique "virtually decided the case for the fiv
e 
justice majority. 1144 The Court stated: 
y 
Thus, [the feasibility provision for 
toxic substances in the Occupational 
Safety and Health Ac~] directs [OSHA] to 
issue the standard that "most adequately 
assures •.. that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health," limited 
only by the extent to which this is 
"capable of being done." In effect then, 
as the Court of Appeals held, Congress 
itself defined the basic relationship 
between costs and benefits, by placing 
the "benefit" of worker health above all 
other considerations save those making 
attainment of this "benefit" 
unachievable. Any standard based on a 
balancing of costs and benefits by (OSHA] 
that strikes a different balance than 
that struck by Congress would be 
inconsistent with the command set forth 
in · [the feasibility provision]. Thus, 
cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not 
required by the statute because 
feasibility analysis is, 452 U.S. 509, 69 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1981) [emphasis added]. 
Furthermore, while the Court recognized that the 
reasonably "necessary or . appropriate definition could b
'e 
44 • Ibid., p. 67. 
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interpreted to require cost-benefit analysis, it stated that 
' .. 
it did not need to reach the issue for toxic substances: 
,, 
For even if it does, Congress 
specifically chose in [the feasibility 
provision] to impose separate and 
additional requirements for issuance of 
a subcategory of occupational safety and 
health standards dealing with toxic 
materials and harmful physical agents: 
it required that those standards be 
issued to prevent material impairment of 
health to the extent feasible. Congress 
could reasonably have concluded that 
heal th standards should be subject to 
different criteria than safety standards 
because of the special problelns presented 
in regulating them, 452 U.S. 512, 69 
L.Ed.2d 204 (1981). 
In other words, the Court held that an interpretation of 
reasonably necessary or appropriate which imposed "an 
additional and overriding requirement of cost-benefit 
analysis" would "eviscerate" the promulgation of toxic 
substance standards according to their to the extent feasible 
requirement, 452 U.S. 513, 69 L.Ed.2d 204 (1981). 
Finally, the Court concluded that "the legislative 
history of the [Occupational Safety and Health] ~ct, while 
concededly not crystal clear ... demonstrates conclusively that 
Congress w~s fully aware that the Act would impose real and 
substantial co,sts of compliance on industry, arid believed· that 
"'\ ' . 
such costs were part of the costs of doing business, " 4 52 U. s. 
514, 69 L.Ed.2d 205 (1981). 
One can draw several conclusions from this discussion of 
judic1a·1 review of standards for t:oxic substances. . ', First, 
Hodgson has remained the controlling precedent supporting 
82 
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substantial evidence review. Beyond this foundation, however 
the circuit cou,rts have developed several incompa~ible 
approaches for reviewing standards under conditions of factual 
uncertainty, as Howard Latin asserts. 45 Appendix III 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court has generally been 
reluctant to review preenforcement cases from the appellate 
courts. Accordingly, one can argue that the Supreme Court 
granted review in Benzene and Cotton Dust in order to bring 
consistency to this area of the law. 
However, it is important to note t~at some analysts, such 
as Neil Sullivan, assert that Benzene and Cotton Dust have 
resulted in more confusion rather than clarity. 46 The 
diversity of opinions in Benzene certainly supports those 
analysts who contend that the decision contributes to 
regulatory confusion. As Sullivan asserts: "The Court 
decided five to four to invalidate the standard, but the 
majority included four separate opinions, three of which were 
significantly dist,inct. 1147 
Moreover, with respect to Cotton Dust, -Sullivan argues 
45 Howard 
Standards: 
Uncertainty," 
pp. 584-85. 
Latin, "The Feasibility Of Occupational Health 
An Essay On Legal Decisionmaking Under 
Northwestern University Law Review 78 (1983), 
46 Neil Sullivan, "The Benzene Decision: A Contribution 
To Regulatory Confusion,'' Administrative Law Review 33. (1981), 
pp. 351-65; Sullivan, "The co·tton ·Dust Decision: The 
Confusion Continues,'' Administrative Law Review 34 (1982), pp. 
483-94. 0 . 
47 Sullivan, "The Benzene Decision,'' p. 354. 
" 
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that the Court's reasoning is ''far too te
nuous to survive as 
,. 
a policy, and thus the problems stemmin
g from the Benzene 
decision will continue. ••
48 He asserts that Cotton Dust does 
not necessarily preclude cost-benefit an
alysis as part of a 
threshold detern1ination of the signific
ance of a hazard. 49 
Hadley and Richman agree with this asser
tion. 50 
Indeed, Hadley and Richman note that Rea
gan's Executive 
Order No. 12291, as previously discuss
ed, requires cost-
benefit analysis regardless of Benzene.
51 Significantly, the 
Court agreed to review the Cotton Dust c
ase on the issue of 
cost-benefit analysis before the executiv
e order was issued. 52 
Sullivan expounds upon these points in 
a discussion of the 
"' 
politics of feasibility: 
Dust, 
"\ 
The political nature of "feasibility" was 
demonstrated incontrovertibly when the 
Reagan administration attempted to 
persuade the Court to remand the 
regulation to OSHA for further
 
consideration. The purpose of the 
reconsideration would have been to apply 
the very cost-benefit analysis that the 
agency had argued during the carter 
administration it was not obligated_ to 
48 Sullivan, "The Cotton Dust Decision," p. 
484. 
49 Ibid.,_p. 492. 
50 Hadley and Richman, ''The Impact Of Ben
zene and 
II p. 69. 
51 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
52 Ibid. 
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Moreover,? Sullivan adeptly summarizes the problems 
inherent in judicic1l review of feasibility as a political 
concept: 
Administrations have been able to read 
meaning into "feasibility•• by deciding 
whether the political support of business 
or labor is more important. The courts 
lack such a point of reference ••• Attempts 
by the courts to determine what the law 
is through the customary methods have 
proven unsuccessful as demonstrated by 
several courts supporting each 
interpretation based on a reading of the 
same leg,islative history •... "feasibility" 
is a thinly veiled political compromise 
which fails to resolve the competing 
claims of business and labor. 54 
In accordance with his political definition of 
feasibility, Sullivan advocates returning the conflict to the 
legislature. It is important to recognize that this view 
corresponds ·· to Justice Rehnquist' s • • • concurring opinion I 1n 
Benzene, as previously mentioned, and his dissent in Cotton 
' Dust. Sullivan supports this view with the fpllowing 
rationale: 
Relative to the other branches of 
government, the legislative body is more 
accountable to public control. By virtue 
of its size, it is closest to the people, 
its procedures are the most open to 
input, and its incentives can,be directly 
53 sui1.ivan, ''The Cotton Dust Decision," p. 487 .-~ At 
Ibid., footnote 27, Sullivan notes that the. Reagan 
administration's interpretation co·ntraste.d with that of the 
three previous admini-strations which had implemented the 
Occupational ·safety and Health Act. 
' 
S4 · Ibid., p. 488. 
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plied by interest groups. 55 
Clearly, Sullivan's analysis as a potential solution to the 
problem of uncertainty in occupational exposure to toxic 
substances merits further consideration in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis. 
A final point in the discussion of judicial review of 
standards for toxic substances is the volume and compl,exi ty 
of the record in preenforcement cases. Reviewing courts often 
express frustration concerning this point. For example, the 
Hodgson court stated that "the record, examined closely in 
relation to the relevant concerns of the Act, leavesonagging 
questions~-even for the inexpert observer--as to the reason 
and rationale for the Secretary's particular choices," 499 
F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis added]. Similarly, in its 
review of the cotton dust standard, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit. remarked: "Our task on 
review has not been easy. The record is massive and 
unwieldy," 617 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In a corresponding 
footnote, the court chastised OSHA for failing to present its 
record in a more organized fashion, 617 F.2d 676 at footnote 
29 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
In sum, these comments by the courts and the! arguments 
concerning the political nature of feasibility ~emonstrate 
that judicial review .is not a panacea for the problem of 
55 Ibid., p. 493. 
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uncertainty in OSHA's regulation of exposure to toxic 
·substances. 
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CHAPTER III 
OSHA 1 S REGULATION OF FORMALDEHYDE 
¢ ••• delay and doctrine should not allow 
OSHA to sidestep the serious questions 
posed by employee exposure to 
formaldehyde, nor avoid its obligation to 
adequately explain its actions. 1 
UAW v. Donovan 
The Ubiquitous Chemical 
Represented by the chemical symbol HCHO, formaldehyde .is 
the simplest member of -the class of chemicals known as 
aldehydes. 2 - Found in all living things, this compound is 
often referred to as "nature's building block" because of its 
importance in the synthesis of DNA. 3 The natural occurrence 
of formaldehyde is matched by its usefulness to man. 
1 590 F.Supp. 752 (D.C.D.C. 1984). 
2 52 FR·46171 (1987). 
Hence, 
3 Rich Christianson and Barbara, Garet, "Formal-dehyde: 
OSHA's Cancer Labeling Provision overturned .•• For Now," Wood 
& Wood Products, April 1988, p. 48. 
88 
formaldehyde is often referred to as "ubiquitous. 
114 
Formaldehyde is a gas at room temperature,· but the term is 
also used to describe various mixtures of formaldehyde, water, 
and alcohol. 5 
Ranked 24th in production volume in the u. s., 
formaldehyde is a major industrial chemical. 6 The chemical 
properties of formaldehyde make it a useful preservative. Two 
familiar uses of formaldehyde as a preservative occur in the 
biology lab and in the embalming process. Because these uses 
of the chemical are so common, one might overlook the direct 
occupational exposure resulting from them. In addition, 
because it possesses a high degree of chemical reactivity, • 
formaldehyde is often used in the production of other 
industrial chemicals. 
Furthermore, formaldehyde is combined with other 
substances to produce compounds and resins which are utilized 
\i 
in various types of manufacturing processes. For example, 
I 
,/-I 
c::~\u-rea-formaldehyde resins are used as glue in the manufacture 
\ 
of particleboard and plywood and are mfxed with sand to create 
foundry molds. It is also significant to note that consumer 
complaints about heal th effects resulting from the urea-
< 
formaldehyde foam insulation process -attracted publicity in 
4 For example, the reader is referred to ·"A letup in the 
drive to regulate formaldehyde," Business Week, October 12, 
1981, p. 88 •. 
5 52 FR 46171 (1987). 
6 52 FR 46172 (1987). 
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the early 1980s. 
This author's discovery that occupational ex~
osure to 
formaldehyde occurs .. in the apparel industry 
provided the 
impetus for this thesis, chiefly because the au
thor could.not 
imagine wha~ purpose formaldehyde cOuld
 • serve in the 
manufacture of clothing.. Subsequently, thi
s author was 
surprised to learn that textiles are treated wit
h formaldehyde 
resins to impart wrinkle-resistancy. 
In the apparel industry, occupation < i.. .. ··•·· . ·- ' ( expo
sure to 
formaldehyde occurs when airborne formaldehy
de offgasses from~ 
treated cloth during the manufacturing proces
s. 7 When the ) 
formaldehyde resins which are used to tre
at cloth are 
originally produced, formaldehyde is transform
ed into other 
chemicals. However, this chemical reaction is r
eversible, and 
c/ 
the manufacturing process causes the com
pound to be 
. 
transformed once 
• again into formaldehyde. Jan Greene 
describes exposure in the apparel industry as 
follows: 
In the garment industries, the.. textile 
mill work-ers are not at greatest risk. 
Formaldehyde in its liquid form is 
ap~lied to the fabric by machine, and few 
workers are needed to run the required 
equipment. The chemical vapor tends to 
come out when the fabric is cut and sewn 
together, and the exposure is often 
greatest when piles of treated cloth used 
in apparel manufacturing are left to sit 
in a warm place and are then moved.
8 
7 52 FR 46173 (1987). 
8 Jan Greene, "Formaldehyde: Debating Rules And 
Risks," 
Daily News Record, June 19, 1985, p. 6." .) , 
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Because wrinkle-resistancy can be imparted to textiles 
with a relatively small amount of formaldehyde, textile 
tre~ting uses only two percent of total formaldehyde 
consumption. 9 However, apparel manufacture is the sixth 
largest industry sector in the U.S., and between 60 and 85 
percent of all apparel fabric is treated. 10 Therefore, one 
can conclude that the apparel industry presents an interesting 
case study in the regulation of toxic substances: a large 
number of workers are exposed to formaldehyde at relatively 
low levels. As the final section of this chapter will 
demonstrate, this type of situation poses significant 
challenges for risk assessment. 
Several types of health effects can result from 
occupational exposure to formaldehyde. Most important, OSHA 
regulates formaldehyde as an occupational carcinogen. 11 
Reported in 1979, the preliminary results of a study conducted 
by:Battelle Columbus Laboratories for the Chemical Industry 
Institute of Toxicology (CIIT) provided the first evidence of 
formaldehyde's carcinogenicity. The CIIT study was a 
bioassay, or animal study, in which rats developed nasal 
cancer from the inhalation of formaldehyde. In its 
rulemaking, OSHA used this rat data as the primary basis of 
9 52 FR 46173. (1987). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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its quantitative estimates of cancer risk. 12 
The inhalation .of airborne formaldehyde can cause 
irritation of the eyes, nose, and throat. 13 Dermal contact . 
with formaldehyde can cause skin irritation. 14 Dermal 
sensitization, or the development of allergic reactions, 
frequently occurs. 15 
I 
History of Formaldehyde Regulation 
Although the debate over formaldehyde's carcinogenicity 
is relatively recent, the irritant effects of the chemical 
have subjected it to scrutiny for years. For instance, the 
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 
(ACGIH) has determined exposure limits for formaldehyde since 
1946. 16 
OSHA based its original formaldehyde exposure limits upon 
standards developed by the • American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) to address formaldehyde's irritant effects.
17 
The agency adopted ANSI's limits as its general industry 
standard in 1971 in accordance with the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act's provision for national consensus standards, 
12 52 FR 46211 (1987). 
13 52 FR 46173 (1987). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 " 52 FR 46169 (1987) ." ~-
17 Ibid. 
92 
.. 
- .~_,,"•-·-------,.:..,.,· •.••••. _ _:-...L_ - , • ---· - , __ :..:__;,~
-,.:.._-,:;, 
I 
.. ' 
~ 
29 u.s.c.A. sec. 655(a) (1985). 
The general industry standard included an eight-hour time 
weighted average (TWA) exposure limit of three parts of 
formaldehyde per million parts of air (ppm). 18 In addit,ion, 
employee exposure could not exceed five ppm at any time during 
an eight-hour shift, except for a maximum period of 30 minutes 
during which the "acceptable maximum peak'' could not exceed 
10 ppm. 19 
In accordance witP7the framework outlined in Chapter II, 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Heal th 
(NIOSH) provided OSHA with a recommendation for lowering 
formaldehyde exposure limits in December 1976._ Again, this 
recommendation _was based -upon the chemical's irritant effects. 
Finding that complaints f~orn workers about eye, skin, and 
respiratory irritation increased when exposure concentrations 
. .f! 
exceeded 1 ppm, NIOSH recommended that OSHA reduce the 
permissible exposure limit · (PEL) to 1 ppm for a 30-minute 
period. 20 
As previously discussed, the CIIT released its 
preliminary findings of carcinogenicity in 1979. A separate 
bioassay conducted at New York University (NYU) corroborated 
these findings. 
It is interesting to observe that· the CIIT - study was 
.. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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sponsored by. the chemical industry. However, formaldehyde 
producers also organiz.ed the Formaldehyd·e Institute in 1979 
"to address the scientific, technical, business,· legal and 
regulatory is~ues confronting the industry. 1121 The 
Formaldehyde Institute charged that the CIIT and NYU bioassays 
should not serve as the sole basis for regulating formaldehyde 
as a· carcinogen. 22 Rather, the Institute asserted,, regulators 
should wait until a human epidemiological study could be 
completed. 23 
As discussed in Chapter II, OEHA's cancer Policy stated 
that animal evidence could be sufficient for regulation as a 
carcinogen. Thus, the CIIT and NYU studies complicated the 
regulatory environment for OSHA. Although the agency had been 
planning some sort of action on formaldehyde, it was now faced 
with the dilemma of whether to regulate the chemical as an 
irritant or carcinogen. 
This debate coincided with the transition from the Carter 
to the Reagan administration. As discussed in Chapter II, the 
change in presidential administration marked a fundamental 
ideological shift · toward deregulatory policy. Th·is shift 
appeared even more dramatic because of the activism of 
21 Rich 
Formaldehyde's 
1988, p. 55. , 
Christianson, "CIIT Sheds New Light On 
Heal th Effects, " Wood & Wood Products, April 
22 Marjorie Sun, "EPA May Be Redefi~ing Toxic Substanc~s·," 
Science 214 (1981), pp. 525-26. · 
.. d 
23 Ibid. 
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President Carter's head of OSHA, Eula Bingham. 
Under Bingham' s leadership, OSHA took several actions 
upon receipt of the preliminary CIIT findings. 24 . The agency 
joined ongoing .formaldehyde studies by the Interagency 
Regulatory Liaison Group ( IRLG) and the Federal Panel on 
Formaldehyde. 25 · In addition, OSHA agreed to cosponsor a NIOSH 
Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) on formaldehyde's 
carcinogenicity. 
From Chapter II, the . purpose of a CIB is to • review 
existing scientific research on a given substance for public 
dissemination. The document does not constitute a formal 
recommendation26 or have regulatory significance if issued 
solely by NIOSH. However, prior to formaldehyde, OSHA had 
agreed to cosponsor certain CIBs with NIOSH; such documents 
24 Nicholas Ashford, c. ~illiam Ryan, and Charles c. 
Caldart, "A Hard Look At Federal Regulation Of Formaldehyde: 
A Departure From Reasoned Decisionmaking, '' Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 7 (1983), p. 346. 
25 Other federal regulatory agencies in addition to OSHA 
were .concerned with formaldehyde's health effects. For 
instance, the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. 94-469, 
October 11, 1976, 90 Stat. 2003, ~s amended, 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 
2601 et. seq. .(1989), .grants the Environmental Protection 
Agency ( EPA) broad authority to regulate toxic substances. 
Furthermore, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was 
also interested in formaldehyde because of complaints from 
consumers about urea-formaldehyde foam insulation. 
26 Here the reader should recall.that NIOSH had issued a 
formal recommendation to r.egulate formaldehyde as an irritant 
in 1976. 
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then had regulatory significance. 27 
Bingham cosigned a pre-publication version .of the 
formaldehyde CIB, • q which was • in available to the public 
r, 
December 1980. 28 NIOSH and OSHA stated that formaldehyde be 
regarded as a potential occupational carcinogen. However, 
when Thorne Auchter became Assistant Secretary for 
Occupational Safety and Health in March 1981, he withdrew 
OSHA's sponsorship of the CIB. 29 NIOSH published the CIB on 
its own in April 1981. 30 
Shortly thereafter, OSHA proposed to fire Dr. Peter 
Infante, director of the agency's Office of Carcinogen 
Identification and Classification. Infante was charged with 
misrepresenting OSHA' s official position on formaldehyde's 
carcinogenicity. The controversy began in May 1981 when 
Infante wrote a letter to John Higginson, director of the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (!ARC), which is 
part of the World Heal th Organization. In this letter, 
Infante expressed his dismay at the IARC's recent decision 
that there was insufficient evidence to classify formaldehyde 
27 u. s. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, of the 
.Committee on Science and Technology, 97th Cong. , 1st sess. , 
July 16, 1981, pp. 57-59. Hereafter cited as Gore Hearings, 
1981. 
28 Ashford, Ry~an, and Caldart, "A Hard Look," p. 347. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Nation~! Institut~ of 6cbupational S~fety and 
Formaldehyde: Evidence of Carcinogenicity, 
Health, 
current 
Intelligence Bulletin 34, April 15, 1981, p. 1. 
L 
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as a carcinogen in animals. Inf ante wrote the letter .. on 
,,~ 
official OSHA stationery and enclosed a copy of the CIB on 
formaldehyde. 
In a letter · to Auchter on May 28, 1981, Higginson 
criticized Infante's action as "an attempt by a United States 
Regulatory Agency to influence the decisions of the [IARC]. 1131 
More important, on June 2, 1981 s. John Byington, an attorney 
for the Formaldehyde ·rnstitute, sent a letter to Auchter's 
I 
• 
special assistant, Mark Cowan, to protest Infante's action. 
Byington's correspondence began with the following question: 
How do you control memb~rs of the 
bureaucracy who seem to be operating 
freely within and without government and 
who seem to have made a decision and now 
are advocating a position rather than 
processing information for the 
appropriate policy decisionmakers?32 
Both the Infante situation and the CIB controversy were 
examined by a House subcommittee chaired by Representative 
Albert Gore (D-Tennessee) . in July 1981. In response to 
another subcommittee member's assertion that such 
congressional oversight "might have a,chilling effect on the 
Federal Government, t, Gore stated: 
If there is a chilling effect ·against 
which we must guard today, it is the 
threat to the integrity of American 
science. The message .that otherwise 
would be sent to all Federal scientists 
is clear: those who t .. ry to do their jobs 
to protect the health of the -A~erican 
31 Gore Hearings, 1981, p. 30. 
32 • Ibid., p. 22. 
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people will instead lose their jobs to 
protect industry profits.n 
When Gore questioned Auchter about whether the decision 
to withdraw OSHA's sponsorship of the CIB·originated with the 
-"" --
Formaldehyde Institute, Auchter replied: 
••• you need to understand· the management 
system in the agency and the policy 
reviews we have been undertaking since I 
was sworn in. " Our approach is pretty 
basic to management, that is, when we 
have a subject for a policy decision, we 
get the appropriate parties involved, we 
research that su};?ject; we analyze the 
data. _We put that data down on paper, 
sit around and discuss it and I make the 
decision. 34 
Gore then examined Cowan about the meeting which he held with 
the Formaldehyde Institute. At this meeting, representatives 
of the Institute allegedly expressed the view that the CIB was 
based upon insufficient data. Gore concluded: 
You had two lawyers representing the 
folks who manufacture formaldehyde 
talking with a lawyer new to_OSHA about 
the scientific evidence on formaldehyde. 
And this formed the basis of your 
judgment that the scientific data 
· compiled by the distinguished team of 
scientists from throughout the Federal 
Government was not to be relied upon. 35 
An illustrative exchange concerning the distinction 
between scientific and policy decisions ensued when Gore asked 
Cowan and Auchter whether they personally lacked confidence 
( 
i 
33 , Ibid. , p. 2 ~, 
34 • Ibid. , p. 59. 
35 Ibid. 
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in the qata upon which the CIB was based. Cowan replied: ''I 
personally am not able to judge that information, as you know 
that I am not a scientist. Others do. 1136 Auchter answered: 
"For regulat,ory purposes, yes ... As a policy decision, I do. ••37 
Gore continued by asking Auchter to identify the OSHA 
scientists whom he had consulted to draw this conclusion. 
Auchter replied that he had never asked that question "for 
regulatory p~rposes. 1138 
Relating the CIB controversy to Infante, Gore told 
Auchter·: 
In the [personnel action] letter to Dr. 
Infante .•.. the first charge is that Dr. 
Infante did not properly reflect OSHA's 
lack of confidence on the part of the 
agency in the data on which the CIB was 
based. Now I can't find anyone other 
than the Formaldehyde Institute and you 
and Mr. Cowan who lack confidence in the 
data on which ... the CIB was based. 39 
Auchter replied that he was not required to comment upon the 
proposal to fire Infante because it was part of his discretion 
as the deciding official. 40 \ 
I 
Gore concluded the hearing by stating: 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
In my opinion, it's clear what happened. 
The Formaldehyde Institute wanted this 
guy out of the Government and the only 
Ibid. , p. 60. 
Ibid (emphasis added]. 
" Ibid. , p. 61. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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charge they could come up with was that' 
he used the OSHA stationery. 41 
In August 19·a1, Auchter informed Infante that he could retain 
his position at OSHA. 42 One can assert that. congressional 
oversight accomplished its purpose in this.instance. 
However, the events ~iscussed above did not fundamentally 
alter OSHA' s newly ado·pted deregulatory philosophy. In 
October 1981, the United Auto Workers (UAW), which represented 
foundry workers exposed to form.aldehyde, and 13 other unions 
petitioned OSHA to issue an emergency temporary standard (ETS) 
• 1n light of the new evidence of formaldehyde's 
carcinogenicity. OSHA denied the petition in January 1982. 
Auchter' s letter to Howard Young, director of the UAW' s Social 
Security Department, provided the following rationale for the 
decision: 
Section 6(c) of the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act allows the Secretary to 
promulgate an emergency ·temporaryQ 
standard without rulemaking only if he 
determines that (a) employees are exposed 
to a grave danger from exposure to toxic 
agents or from new hazards, and (b) that 
such emergency standard is necessary to 
protect ·employees from such danger. I 
believe that emergency temporary 
standards are appropriate only· in 
response to extraordinary conditions 
which result in the exposure of employees 
to a grave danger during the course of 
41 b. d . !_1 ., p. ~2. 
l ~ 
42 Clyde H. Farnsworth, ''Reinstatement at OSHA," The New 
York Times,·August 10, 1981, p. D2. 
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their employment. 43 ' 
In other words,· Auchter felt that the CIIT and NYU studies did 
not prove that workers exposed to formaldehyde were in grave 
danger. 44 
Organized labor· filed suit in. district court to compel 
'~~ OSHA to issue the ETS. In UAW v. Donovan, ?90 F.Supp. 747 
(D.C.D.C. 1984), 45 the district court required OSHA to 
reconsider its denial of the ETS and its decision to delay 
permanent rulemaking for formaldehyde. 
/ 
The court found that a narrow standard of review was 
appropriate for two reasons. First, the court stated that the 
case involved an agency's decision not to act, UAW v. Donovan, 
' 
590 F.Supp. 747 (D.C.D.C. 1984). Accordingly, in their 
analysis of formaldehyde regulation, Nicholas Ashford, c. 
William Ryan, and Charles c. Caldart note the judiciary•s. 
traditional deference to agencies which have chosen not to 
act. 46 Furthermore, the court emphasized the special character 
of summary procedures such as the ETS, UAW v. Donovan, 590 
F.Supp. 749, 750 (D.C.D.C. 1984). In sum, the court reached 
the following conclusion on the appropriate standard of 
43 Letter from Thorne Auchter to Howard Young (January 29, 
1982), cited in Ashford, Ryan, and Caldart, "A Hard Look," p. 
348. 
44 Ashford, Ryan, and Caldart, ''A Hard .Look," pp. 348-49. 
45 As discussed in Appendix · III, , th~ ~ase wa·s later 
transferred to the court of appeals on procedural grounds;, the 
court of app'eals upheld 'the order· of the district , court.,' 
46 Ashford, Ryan, and Caldart, ''A Hard Look," p. 304. 
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• review: 
The theme of these cases is one of 
deference and restraint. OSHA may issue 
an ETS only in "extraordinary 
circumstances." Judicial review of an 
OSHA decision not to regulate is 
''extremely· narrow." Reversal of OSHA' s 
decision . here thus requires the 
exceptional to. exist from both 
"substantive" and · "judicial review" 
perspectives, UAW v. Donovan, _ 59 o · F. Supp. 
751 (D.C.D •. C. 1984). 
\ . 
However, the court also stated th.at the narrow standard · of -
review did not exempt OSHA from ''reasoned explanation'' of its 
action, UAW v. Donovan, 590 F.Supp. 751 (D.C.D.C. 1984). 
The court continued that, even before the narrow standard 
of review_could be applied, the appropriate threshold question 
involved "whether the Court, some three years after the 
petition was filed, should even engage in review," given the 
temporal nature of an ETS, UAW v. Donovan, 590 F.Supp. 751 
(D.C.D.C. 1984). The court stated: 
... litigation--particularly this 
litigation--is historical in nature; 
judicial review i$ based on ''the record" 
before the agency at the time of its 
decision. The VAW filed its petition in 
1981. OSHA den'ied it in 1982. This is 
1984 •••• A judicially-declared "emergency" 
standard would be in effect from June to 
December 1984, yet be based on a record 
as it (may have) existed as of Januaty 
1982, UAW v. Donovan, 590 F.Supp. 752 
(D.C.D.C. 1984). 
The court then cited several scientific and regulatory 
developments which had subsequently occurred· in relation.ship 
to formaldehyde and concluded that remanding the case to.OS~ 
was appropriate:, 
Surely the statutory purpose [ of · ''best 
avail-able evidence'' in the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act] is better served 
by initial agency review of all current 
d.a\:a and analyses, rather than by 
judicial review of a record as it existed 
over two years ago, UAW v. Donovan, 590 
F.Supp. 753 (D.C.D.C. 1984). 
Finally, the court also concluded that remand was 
appropriate because of the inadequacy of -OSHA' s explanation 
for its denial. The court charged that OSHA's denial was "no 
~ 
model of agency explanation,'' UAW v. Donovan, 590 F.Supp. 753 
(D.C.D.C. 1984). The court then stated: 
Al though the agency should not be 
required to reinvent the wheel whenever 
it denies an ETS petition, it must at 
minimum meet the requirements of the 
"fundamental requirement of reasoned 
explanation,'' including adequately 
"informing the aggrieved .person of the 
grounds of the administrative action, " 
UAW v. Donovan, 590 F.Supp. 753 (D.C.D.C. 
1984) , citing Matlovich v. Secretary of 
the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
~~ 
In January 1985, OSHA once again denied the ETS petition, 
but also announced that it would hold pu_blic meetings in 
February 1985 to gather information on whether permanent 
rulemaking should commence. 47 l)n the basis of these hearings, 
the agency decided in April 1985 to proceed with permanent 
rulemaking and published a proposed rul~ on December 10, 
1985. 48 Unions charged that OSHA already had sufficient 
information and was ,,simply employing ''delaying tactics'' 
47 52 FR 46171 (1987). 
48 Ibid. 
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throughout this period. 49 
The proposed :r;ule included two regulatory 
' 
/ 
< 11 j 
options--
carcinogen and irritant. The stricter carcinogen option 
proposed a PEL of· 1 ppm and also-, included various other 
protections. 
proposed to 
The less protective irritant option simply 
lower the 1.5 ppm. The I economic PEL to 
implications of this choice were significant. One estimate 
projected capital costs of $57.8 million and annual costs of 
$28.3 million for regulation as a carcinogen, while the costs 
associated with regulation as an irritant were $38.9 million 
and $17.0 million, respectively. 50 
Organized labor sharply attacked the two-option proposal. 
For example, UAW President Owen Bieber stated: 
After five years of delay, OSHA has 
finally offered an outdated, inadequate 
proposal which would actually allow some 
employers to increase formaldehyde 
exposures on the job .... It's about time 
that OSHA has come out of hiding and 
produced a formaldehyde proposal for 
public discussion, but OSHA's proposal is 
so half-hearted that we question the 
sincerity of the agency. Secretary of 
Labor Wi·lliam Brock has promised some 
changes at OSHA. We are still It t 51 wa1 1ng ... '._ 
49 Vicky Cahan and Paula Dwyer, ''Formaldehyde limits: A 
continuing battle," Chemical Week, April 17, 1985, pp. 11, 13. 
50 
"Benzene, Formaldehyde: 
proposed," Chemical & Engineering 
4. 
I 
Workplace exposure limits 
News, December 9, 1985, p. 
51 Richard M. Kendall, . ''Health Standards Draw Criticism, 
Charges of OM~ Interference,'' Occupational Hazards, May 1986, 
pp. 64-65. 
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Early in 1986, the · National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
released the results of a long-awaited eptdemiological study 
on formaldehyde. The study immediately sparked a new 
controversy o.ver formaldehyde. 
The NCI study of more than 26,000 industria.l workers 
found "little evidence that exposure to formaldehyde in the 
workplace is associated with cancer deaths. 1152 NCI reported 
"a 32 percent 'excess' in lung cancer deaths among workers 
after 20 years from their first exposure" and found "higher 
than expected rates of upper-respiratory cancer. 1153 However, 
the NCI concluded that "these increased cancers could not be 
linked to formaldehyde because workers with. longer and heavier 
exposure did not show higher cancer rates than those with 
lesser exposure. 1154 
The study drew criticism from organized labor not only 
for its conclusions, but also for the involvement of industry 
officials from the Formaldehyde Institute and the DuPont and 
Monsanto chemical companies. When the results were released, 
NCI's Aaron Blair, the director of the study, justified the 
collaboration with industry in order to get better information 
from the companies but denied industry influence of the 
52 National Cancer Institute, Cancer and Formaldehyde: 
Mortality Among Industrial Workers, Cancer Facts, ·March 1986, 
p. 1. 
53 Peter Perl, "Cancer-Link C6nc1u·sions In Dispute,'' The 
• {'I ti . 
'/, 
Washington Post, Marc~ 3, 1986, p. Al. 
54 Ibid. 
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results. 55 
The NCI study became the focus of the _rulemaking hea-rings 
in May 198656 and prompt~d a congressional investigation in 
July 1986. A House subcommittee chaired by Representative 
John D. Dingell CD-Michigan) questioned Blair and other NCI 
officials about the relationship between the study's 
optimistic conclusions and industry's participation in the 
study. Represe11ta-t-iv€ Ren---Wyden · (-D~-0-I"-e.ggn). --criticized Blair 
for briefing the Formaldehyde , Institute on the study in 
September 1985 while failing to respond to requests for 
information from officials at OSHA and EPA. 57 Blair admitted 
that he had reported the findings to the Institute because 
they were assisting in the study. 58 Furthermore, Dingell 
questioned Blair and other officials about a provision in the 
study protocol which stated that industry representatives had 
to agree to any technical changes in the design of the ~study. 59 
Finally, when OSHA closed the rulemaking record for 
formaldehyde in January 1987, it consisted of approximately 
' 
55 
"Formalde.Jl,yde Study Se~s Little Cancer-Death Link,'' The 
Wall Street Journal, March 4, l986, p. 10. 
56 5 2 FR 4 61 71 ( 19 8 7 ) • 
57 u. s. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight ot the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., July 
28, 1986, pp. 77-78. 
58 Ibid., p. 78~. 
' 59 Susan Okie, ''Formaldehyde study Criticized," The 
Washington Post, July 29, 1986,p. Al3. 
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30,000 pages of testimony and comments. 60 
The Final Standard 
Relying· upon the CIIT study as the primary basis for its 
risk assessment, OSHA's final standard regulates formaldehyde 
as an occupational carcinogen, as previously discussed. The 
standard has lowered the PEL for formaldehyde from 3 ppm to 
1 ppm as an. eight-hour TWA. 61 In other words, an employee 
cannot be exposed to more than 1 ppm averaged over an eight-
hour . work shift. In addition, the standard establishes a 
short-term exposure limit {STEL) of 2 ppm for any 15-minute 
period. 62 Furthermore, OSHA has adopted an "action level" of 
0.5 ppm for an eight-hour period. 63 "If the exposure level is 
maintained below the STEL and the action level, employers may 
discontinue exposure monitoring and certain employee 
training. 1164 The standard contains various other protective 
provisions as well. 65 
Even before the revised standard was published in the 
~ 52 FR 46171 (1987). 
61 The reader should recall from previous discussio~ that 
TWA refers to a time-weighted average. 
The 
62 Henry Weinstein, ''Formaldehyde Exposure Levels 
Los Angeles Times, November 21, 1987, p. 34. 
63 Ibi'd. 
J 
Cut," 
64 u. s. Department of Labor, U. s. Department of Labor 
Program Highlights, Fact Shee·t No. OSHA-87-27. 
65 The reader is referred to 52 FR 46168 (1987) for a 
summary of the standard. 
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Federal Register on December 4, 1987, industry and organized 
. ' 
".,.,..• 
labor had (iled suits for preenforcement review.M Peter J. 
Sheridan offers the following description of the "race to the 
courthouse": 
The formaldehyde standard was posted in 
the Federal Register. at noon on December 
2, 1987. Moments later, the Formaldehyde 
Institute (FI) was filing its suit in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in New Orleans. Simultaneously, 
in Washington, D.C., the [UAW]" were 
filing their suit in.the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. As fast as FI and UAW arrived 
at the courthouses, they lagged a minute 
behind the Amalgamated Clothing and 
Textile Workers Union and the 
International Ladies Garment Workers 
Union who had filed a separate suit in 
the D.C. appellate court. As it turned 
out, the two unions were a minute early, 
and, therefore, had to re-file. 67 
Sheridan explains • unions often "race to the that the 
courthouse" in Washington under the assumption that that 
circuit's court of appeals is libera·l.M Similarly, industry 
hurries toward the Cou:r_t ... of Appeals for the Fifth Circu·it -in 
/ 
-. I 
661A relevant political cartoon includes personifications 
of the Formaldehyde Institute, UAW, and the Amalgamated 
Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) as sprinters and 
a judge holding a stopwatch. The judge comments: "Another 
race to the court house over a health standard .•• Talk about 
deja-vu!" (Illustration by John Be·ukemann, accompanying Pe·t~r 
J. Sheridan, ''Will OSHA' s Formaldehyde Standard Withstand 
Court Challenges? 11 Occupational Hazards, April 1·999, p. 50. 
67 Sheridan, ''Will OSHA's Formaldehyde Standard," p. 51. 
68 Ibid. 
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New Orleans because it. is known to be conservative. 69 
Joined by 13 companies and associations, the Formaldehyde 
Institute focused its suit upon the - standard's 
.,,. . labeling 
requirements, which were more extensive than those of OSHA's 
generic hazard communication standard. 70 Industry also filed 
I' 
·for an administrative stay of the provisions from OSHA. 71 
OSHA designed these more extensive labeling provisions. 
to address the special proble~ of formaldehyde emission from 
products; this was the first time OSHA attempted to address 
such an issue. 72 John F. Murray, president of the Formaldehyde 
Institute,· noted that OSHA had not included the labeling 
provisions in the proposed rule for conunent.n If the agency 
had included them, Murray stated, "we would have been there 
(at public meetings] for three weeks. 1174 
The same provisions also came under scrutiny from the 
Office of Management and Budget (0MB). Under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1980, Pub.L. 96-511, Sec. 2(a), Dec. 11, 
1980, 94 Stat. 2812, as amended, 44 U.S.C.A. 3501 et seq. 
( 1989), 0MB has the authority to review the recordkeeping 
requirements of federal agencies to ensure that they do not 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. , p. 52. 
71 Ibid. , p. 53. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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impose an undue burden on the regulate
d parties, such as 
' 
OSHA's employers • 0MB. partially app
roved the labeling 
. __ ~ re"qllirements. 75 OSHA later resubmitted the requireme
nts, 76 and 
0MB subsequently approved them. 
77 However, industry contiriueq 
I 
I, 
to pursue the issue with OSHA. Finally, t
he agency agreed t°" 
issue an administrative stay of the cont
ested provisions.n 
The formaldehyde preenforcement ch
allenges were 
consolidated into UAW v. Pendergrass, 878
 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 
1989), which was decided on June 9, 1989. T
he reader should 
note that consolidation before the Cour
t of Appeals for the 
D. C. Circuit was advantageous for o
rganized labor., as 
previously discussed. Accordingly, the 
court held that OSHA 
did not sufficiently explain its findin
g that formaldehyde 
presented no significant carcinogenic 
risk to workers at 
exposure levels of 1 ppm or less, UAW v. 
Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 
389 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court stated: 
While our deference to the agency is at
 
a peak for its choices among scientific
 
predictions, we must still look for some
 
articulation of reasons for those
 
choices. Here the estimates (of cancer 
risk] are all over the lot, UAW v. 
Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
Hence, OSHA must now reconsider its r
isk assessment for 
~ 53 FR 6628 (1988). 
~ 53 FR 26329 (1988). 
n 53 FR 45080 (1988). 
78 53 FR 50198 (198·8). The administrative stay
 rendered 
this portion of the Forma'ldehyde Institu
te' s ·suit moot. 
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exposures of 1 ppm or less. 
The Politics of Formaldehyde 
The decision in UAW v. Pendergrass is precisely what 
0 
unions in the apparel industry were seeking. As previously 
discussed, a significant number of garment workers are exposed 
to formaldehyde at levels below 1 ppm. In 1986 Jack 
Sheinkman, secretary-treasurer.of the ACTWU, stated that "a 
million apparel workers are subject to low levels of exposure, 
~-
including a quarter million with a 0.5 parts exposure, and 
another 14, 000 textile workers have higher exposure levels." 79 
Sheinkman concluded: "Although these workers are not exposed 
to the highest levels of formaldehyde ... their numbers are so 
great that any significant risk of cancer or other diseases 
must be taken seriously. 1180 
The apparel industry has responded by stating that 
further reductions· in exposure levels will • require some 
combination of ventilation • • engineering controls and 
afterwashing of fabric--alternatives so costly that the 
domestic garment industry will be crippled. 81 
One possible solution to the problem would be a reduction 
79 Hal Taylor, "ACTW Says Proposed US Regs On Formaldehyde 
Still Unsafe," Daily News Record, May 21, 1986, p. 8. 
so Ibid. 
81 For example, the reader is ref e~red to Greene, 
"Formaldehyde: Debating Rules And Risks," p. 6, and Hal 
Taylor, "ACTWU blasts proposal on formaldehyde," Women's Wear 
Daily, May 14, 1986, p. 19. 
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in the amount of formaldehyde used in textile-treating. An 
,, 
anonymous shirt company executive has stated that lowering the 
amount of formaldehyde will not significantly alter durable-
press properties. 82 Of course, the b.est solution w:ould be the 
elimination of formaldehyde in textile-treating. Accordingly, 
a new technique which substitutes nontoxic polycarboxylic 
acids for formaldehyde has been developed. 83 However, the 
apparel industry generally goes on record as stating that no 
viable alternatives to formaldehyde exist, chiefly because of 
, 
cost. 
Thus, until a product is developed which can 
simultaneously meet the demands of the apparel manufacturers, 
garment workers, and consumers, the politics of formaldehyde 
will continue at OSHA. 
I_ 
82 Matthew Kasten, "Say Less Formaldehyde May Not Alter 
DP Properties,'' Daily Ne~s Record, April 24, 198,7, p. 7. 
B. J. Spalding, ''Wrinkle-free fabric 83 ' sans 
formaldehyde," Chemical Week, September 7, 1988, p. 38. 
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CONCLUSION \ 
Does politics change science? No, 
it should be the other way around. 1 
,. 
Dr. Peter Infante. 
" The Fundamental Issue 
This thesis has examined how both objective, scientific 
findings and subjective, political decisions shape OSHA' s 
regulation of toxic substances under conditions of 
uncertainty. The fundamental question underlying the present 
work is: To what extent should political considerations 
,.,,., 
influence /rec}-ulatory policy in an environment of scienti-fic 
uncertainty? 
This author concludes that such regµlatory policy should 
take subjective, political factors into account precisely 
because it is pol icy. In other words, pol icy represents 
-
soci~ty•s attempts to resolve critical issues which are of a 
subjective nature. Nevert~el~ss, this author also ass~rts 
t 
that some elements of the regulatory policy process can 
incorporate political. factors more legitimately than others.· 
1 
. Statement issued by Dr. 
attorney, in Marjorie sun,. "A 
Science 213 (1981), p. 631. 
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Thus, the author must attempt to differentiate between"those 
elements which can legitimately be influenced by politicai 
considerations and those aspects which should remain insulated ti 
... 
from ~uch factors. 
Although proposed solutions to this broad problem will 
necessarily seem incomplete, this author will offer several 
hypotheses based upon an examination of the appropriate roles 
~ of the legislature, judiciary, and bureaucracy in th~ 
regulation of occupational ~xposure to toxic substances. 
Congress 
A discussion of the appropriate role of Congress in the 
regulation of occupational exposure to toxic substances should 
focus upon the view expressed by some analysts that the 
feasibility language of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 197.0 represents an invalid delegation of legislative 
authority to the bureaucracy. The author's position is that, 
··, 
"-", 
• 
given the level of knowledge when the Act was adopted, this 
language did not constitute an invalid delegation. · The 
analysis in Chapter I demonstrated that ~ongress acted under 
circumstances of limited information on occupational health 
at the time of passage. Thus, by differentiating between 
safety and heal th concerns and including a specific toxic 
substance provision, Congress displayed a significant amount 
of foresight. 
However, in light of increased information concerning the 
-
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health effects of occupational exposure to toxic substances 
as well as th~ costs associated with regulation; one might 
find the legislative delegation argument increasingly 
credible. At., this point, the reader should recall Neil 
Sullivan's assertions, which were discussed in Chapter II. 
Briefly, Sullivan contends that Congress can best resolve the 
controversy surrounding feasibility in the regulation of 
C 
occupational exposure to toxic substance because it is most 
accountable to the public and provides the most legitimate 
forum for interest group activity. 
The logic of Sullivan's argument would suggest a 
congressional reconsideration of the feasibility issue. While 
this proposal from a legal perspective, 
• 1S is sound it 
impractical because Congress cannot be forced to reconsider 
the issue. Furthermore, an analysis of congressional motives 
for legislative delegation from an interest group perspective 
demonstrates that Congress is unlikely to reconsider the issue 
voluntarii~ 'given the controversiality of issues surrounding 
OSHA in general. 
Accordingly, a recurring theme in the interest group 
literature is that legisfators seek to avoid-conflict for fear 
of electoral sanction. As Michael T. Hayes states 
• in 
· discussing Morris P. Fiorina's research on congressional roll 
call voting behavior: 
The ap~eal. of legislative delegation as 
a response to conflictual demand patterns 
[among interest groups] is suggested by 
Fiorina's recent effort to deveiop a 
( 115 
rational choice model of congr
essional 
roll .call voting behavior based
 on the 
assumption .. that the primary goa
l of any 
congressman must be to 
secure 
reelection ••.. congressmen from 
deeply 
divided constituencies are 
clearly 
confronted with a no-win situat
ion, as 
any explicit ch~ice among the con
flicting 
interests must '--/forfeit the e
lectoral 
support of the losing groups.
2 
Specifically, Hayes discusses "th
e reluctance of Congress to 
choose between business and labo
r intJrests," which are "two 
competing and well-organized inte
rests. 113 
In sum, although Congress could 
provide an appropriate 
forum for the resolution of th
e political implications of 
feasibility, this author believe
s that it is unlikely to do 
so because of tpe controversy wh
ich OSHA has engendered. In 
contrast, Congress has been will
ing to pursue its oversight l 
and investigatory functions in th
e regulation of occupational 
exposure to toxic substances. 
This author contends that 
legislators are more willing to
 engage in such activities 
because they do not fear elec
toral sanction from them. 
Indeed, the legislator may capita
lize upo~ his participation 
in such activities by presenting
 htmself to his constituency 
as a "watchdog" over the bureauc
racy. 
\. 
However, the reader should n
ot misinterpret this 
2 Michael T. Hayes, "The Semi-Sove
reign Pressure Groups: 
A Critique of Current Theory and a
n Alternative Typology,'' The 
Journal of Politics. 40 (1978), p. 13
7, citing Morris P. 
Fiorina, Representatives, Roll
. Calls, and Constituencies 
(Lexington: D. c. Heath, Lexington Book
s, 1975) •. 
3 Hayes, "The Semi-sovereign Press
ure Groups,1 p. 152. 
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examination of congressional motives as a criticism of the 
oversight and investigatory functions. As the analysis of 
formaldehyde in Chapter III illustrates, these functions play 
a vital role in the regulatory process. 
The Judiciary 
Chapter II demonstrates that judicial • review cannot 
provide a clear solution to the problem of regulation under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty. The chapter highlights 
two major deficiencies in preenforcement review of OSHA's 
standards. First, as Sullivan asserts, because feasibility 
is a political rather than legal concept, the courts cannot 
adequately define the term. The result is inconsistency of 
opinions among the reviewing courts. As the analysis of the 
Benzene and Cotton Dust decisions demonstrates, even the 
Supreme Court failed to bring consistency to this area of the 
law. In addition, judges often express their frustration at 
reviewing unwieldy records replete with sci,ntific and 
technical data. It is unreasonable to expect even the most 
competent judges to be equal to such a task. 
The formaldehyde cases in Chapter III demonstrate that 
the judiciary can play a critical role in the regulation of 
occupational exposure to toxic substances by forcing OSHA to 
justify its actions with substantial evidence. However, the 
difficulty inherent in this role is that the justificat.ions 
which judges require can have broad technical and political 
117 
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consequences which they are unqualified to impose. Court-
,, 
mandated cost-benefit analysis provides an excellent example. 
Accordingly, this author argues that the Supreme Court stopped 
a• .' 
short of requiring cost-benefitqanalysis in Benzene because 
• 
a 
it recognized that it· was unqualified to make this type of 
policy decision. 
This author concludes that, in the regulation of 
occupationa~ exposure to toxic substances, the judiciary walks 
a fine line between the f~lfillment of it~ appropriate role 
through the use of the substantial evidence test a,nd the 
unqualified imposition of justification requirements with 
broad policy consequences. 
The Bureaucracy 
This chapter has discussed the problems inherent in the 
roles of Congress and the judiciary in the regulation of 
occupational exposure to toxic substances. Congress would 
provide an appropriate forum for the resolution of the 
feasibility issue because it is accountable to the··public and 
can most legitimately account for interest group activity. 
However, it is precisely this openness which subjects Congress 
to electoral sanction. Thu~, Congress chooses to avoid 
controversial issues such as feasibility and prefers to limit 
r\ 
. . 
• 
its involvement to the oversight and investigation of~OSHA's · 
activity. On the other hand, the judiciary•s appropriate role' 
in matters of scientific uncertainty is more limited than the 
118 
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legislature's, although one must note that its a
dtlons can~ 
haile broad policy conseque}\ces which it is -unqualif,ied to 
• impose. 
• 
. . 
~--
Therefore, th·is author concludes that the bureqU
c 
rema.ins th.e appropriate arena in which to resolve t
he prob em 
' 
of scientific uncertainty 
V 
in regulatory policy. This 
conclusion assumes that the bureaucracy could.be r
edesigned 
t9 provide an optimal mix of legislative acpessi
bility--to 
account for subjective, political factors--and judicial 
insulation with the added benefit of technical exp
ertise--to 
ensure scientific objectivity. 
In terms of this model, thi.$ thesi1s has clearl.y 
• 
demonstrated that OSHA's regulation of toxic subs
tances is 
too accessible tQ subjective, political factors. This author 
contends that' the key element for change -~SHA
 Is reliance 
• ' 
• 
+ 
~ .. 
upon scientific and technical information. from·.sourc
es outside· 
. 
the government. Furthermore, the analy·s.is of fo
rmaldehyde . 
shows that several federal 
• 
I .• I • 
< 'C,, . 
in . ~dd1 t1on to OSHA: ! · · agencies 
. . 
require objective information on toxic sub.stances in ·order to 
fulfill their statutory mandates. Thus··, . origin
al research 
{' 
. 
efforts sponsored jointly· by these agencies might be an 
integral part of the solution to· the pro.bl8_m of s
cientifi<r. 
uncertainty in regulatory policy. 
~ 
. . 
.. 
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APPENDIX I. 
SUMMARY OP FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH 
REGULATION 
Mining has been recognized historically as a particularly 
dangerous occupation and has been regulated extensively. This 
appendix discusses those aspects of mine safety and health 
which are significant to the development of U.S. occupational, 
safety and health policy in general. 
For example, one of the earliest federal attempts to deal 
with occupational safety and health was included in the Bureau 
of Mines Organic Act of 1910, which created the Bureau within 
the Interior Department. T~is Act provided that one of the 
Bureau's duties be the study of mine safety arid health, May 
,, 
16, 19·10, c. 240, Sec. 2-3·, 36 Stat. 370, as amended, 30 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 3, 5 (1986) .• However, the Bureau's powers were 
restricted because it was not authorized to conduct 
inspect.ions. Later acts, culminating in the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub.L. 91-173, Dec. 30, 1969, 
83 Stat. 7·42, a~ amended, granted the,_ Bureau enforcement 
~ 
powers. 
However, the problem with vesting enforcement for safety 
and health in the Department o~Int.erior ·was that a conflict 
of interest existed between the Department's 
• various 
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missions. 1 Because one of the Department's missions was to 
promote the development of the mining industry, it seemed to 
be an ally of business interests. On the other hand, this 
alliance ·might 
responsibilities 
regulation. 
interfere 
for enforcing 
with 
• mine 
- the 
safety 
Department's 
and health 
This argument is precisely the one used by organized 
labor to protest the Interior Department's -creation of . a new 
enforcement agency, the • • Mining 
Administration (MESA), • in 1973. 
Enforcement 
The unions 
and Safety 
I 
argued that 
enforcement be transferred to the Department of Labor because 
they considered Interior to be "industry-oriented."2 
< 
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 greatly ~ 
altered the regulatory framework, Pub.L. 95-164, Nov. 9, 1977, 
91 Stat. 1290, as amended, 30 U.S. C. A. Sec. 801 et seq. 
~ (1989). The Act transferred enforcement to a new agency 
within the Department of Labor, the Mine Safety and Health 
.· .. 
Administration (MSHA). Furthermore, it improved protection 
for miners who are not employed in the coal industry. These 
r~ 
miners had been covered by the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic 
\ . 
1 u. s. Congress, Senate, Human Resources Committee--
Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, S. Rep. 
No. 95-181, -95th Cong., 1st sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code 
Congressional & Administrative News 3, p.· 3405. 
2 Nicholas · Ashford, Crisis in the Workplace: 
occupational· Disease and Injury, A Report to the Ford 
Foundation (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1976), p. 52, 
citing-occupational Safet~ and Health.Reporter (the Bureau of 
~ational Affairs, Inc.), Vol. 2, No. 49 (May 10, 1973), p. 
1441; Vol. ·3, No. 1 (June 7, 1973), pp. 28, 30. · 
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-Mine Safety Act of 1966, Pub.L. 89-577,· Sept. 16, 1966, 80 
Stat. 772, but the protection provid~d by this legislation was 
not as comprehensive as that provided to coal miners by the 
1969 Act. Thus, the 1977 Act repealed the 1966 Act and 
redesignated the 1969 Act as applicable to all miners. 
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APPENDIX II 
CHRONOLOGY OF STANDARD-SETTING ACTIVITY1 
NIOSH 
Recommendation 
(Criteria 
Document) 
Advisory 
Committee 
(First 
Meeting) 
Emergency 
Temporary 
standard • Hearings 
(ETS) I Begin 
1/72 2/72 12/7/71 none 
Most current significant • • 6/20/86. revision 
none 6/73 5/3/73 9/73 
MOCA2 standard deleted 8/20/76 to conform to 
judicial decision. 
fy 
• 
3/74 none ~/5/74 6/74 
• 
,,-·--.._. 
Final 
Standard 
6/7/72 
', ... ; 
1/29/74 
10/4/74 
,,.,,// 
1 Adapted from John M. · 
Regulation: How Overregulation 
MIT Press, 1988), pp. 268-71. 
Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance 
I • ,· Causes Underregulation (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
2 4,4-methylene-bis(2-chloroaniline). 
1 
• 
. . 
OSHA 
Standard 
Coke Oven 
Emissions 
Benzene 
DBCP3 
• Arsenic 
( Inorganic) 
Cotton Dust 
NIOSH 
Recommendation 
(Criteria 
Document}. 
2/73 
Advisory 
Committee 
(First 
Meeting) 
11/74 
Emergency 
Temporary 
Standard 
{ETS} 
none 
Hearings 
Begin 
11/75 
Revised 9/13/85 to conform to judicial decision. 
7/74 none 5/3/77 7/77 
Standard deleted 6/19/81 to conform to judicial 
decision; revised standard promulgated 9/11/87. 
9/77 none 9/9/77 12/77 
1/74 none none 4/75 
Supplemental statement on risk assessment issued 
·, \\ t I I t I 1/14/83 to conform to Judicial· decision. • 
9/74 none none 4/77 
Revised 12/13/85 to conform to judicial decision. 
\ 
3 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane . 
.. 
r 
Final 
Standard 
10/22/76 
2/10/78 
3/17/78 
5/5/78 
6/23/78 
f 
' 
) 
OSHA 
Standard 
'-'? . ~ ' 
NIOSH 
Recommendation 
(Criteria 
Document} 
Advisory 
Committee 
(First 
Me·eting) 
Emergency 
Temporary 
Standard 
(ETS) 
I 
I 
.. 
. ' 
Hearings 
• Begin 
Acrylonitrile 9/77 
Lead 1/73 
none· 
none 
1/17/78 
none 
3/78 
3/77 
Cancer 
Policy 
Access to 
Employee 
Records4 
Revised 11/12/82 to conform to judicial decision; 
economic and technological feasibility determined 
for nine industry sectors 7/11/89 to conform to judicial decision. 
none none none 5/78 
Feasibility revisions 1/21/81 to conform to 
benzene decision; administrative stays of 
candidate and priority lists 1/5/82 and 1/4/83-
none none none 12/78 
Proposal to modify rule 7/13/82; numerous 
administrative stays beginning in 1982. 
• 
Final 
Standard 
10/3/78 
11/14/78 
1/22/80 
5/23/80 
' 
4 Judicial review has deter.,mined that this requirement is a "rule" rather 
than a II standard. 11 The reader is ref erred to Appe-ndix III. 
• 
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OSHA 
standard 
Coal Tar 
Pitch, 
NIOSH 
Recommendation 
• • • (Criteria 
Document), 
' 
Advisory 
Committee 
(First 
Meeting) 
Emergency 
Temporary 
Standard 
(ETS) 
• Hearings 
• Begin 
Final 
Standard 
Modified 
Interpretation 9/77 none none 5/82 . 1/21/83 
Original interpretation adopted 11/il/72; modified 
to exclude petroleum asph~lt from coverage. 
Hazard 
Communication 1974 9/74 none 6/82 1/25/83 
Rulemaking began for "Hazard Identification" but 
was withdrawn 2/12/81; the more comprehensive 
"Hazard Communication" standard includes material 
safety data sheets (MSDS) and employee training; 
coverage extended to nonmanufacturing sectors 
8/24/87 to conform to judicial decisions. 
Ethylene Oxide none · none none 7/83 6/22/84 
• 
Standard revised 10/11/85 to exclude labeling of 
pesticides regulated by EPA under Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); 
organized labor and public interest groups 
~ unsuccessfully argued that OSHA's label was more 
expl~cit than EPA's . 
' 
OSHA 
Standard 
0 
NIOSH 
Recommendation 
(Criteria · 
Document) 
Advisory 
Committee-
(First 
Meeting) 
c: 
Emergency' 
Temporary 
·standard 
(ETS) 
• Hearings 
• Begin 1( 
.. 
Final 
Standard 
Formaldehydeo 12/76 none5 none 5/86 12/4/87 
Air 
Contaminants 
Hazard communication provisions temporarily stayed 
12/13/88 so that full provisions of generic hazard· 
communication standard could be incorporated. 
none6 none none 7/88 
Original adoption of established federal standards 
5/29/71; revision lowered 212 exposure limits and 
established new limits for 164 substances not 
previously regulated. · 
.. 
1/19/89 
5 Eight federal agencies, including OSHA, participated in the Federal Panel 
on Formaldehyde,. which was formed 4/80. 
6 At 54· FR. 2369 (1989), OSHA explains that NIOSH recommended new or lower 
exposure limits (RELs) for approximately 190 chemicals in Reco~mendations _for 
Occupational Safety and Health Stan~~~ds, Sept. 1986. 
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APPENDIX III 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STANDARDS1 
Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records 
Louisiana Chemical Association v. Bingham 
657 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981) 
The district court dismissed the case for want of 
jurisdiction, 496 F.Supp. 1188 (W.D.La. 1980), since the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act grants the appellate court 
original jurisdiction for preenforcement review of standards. 
On appeal, the court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded 
this case to the district court. The court of appeals held 
that the regulations governing access to records be treated 
as a "rule" under the Act's provision for employer 
recordkeeping requirements, 29 u.s.c.A. Sec. 657(c) and (f) 
(1985), rather than a "standard" issued according to 29 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 655(b) (1985). Thus, the district court had 
jurisdiction. The lower court affirmed the standard, 550 F. 
Supp. 1136 (W.D.La. 1982), and the court of appeals affirmed 
the decision without opinion, 731 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1984). 
Acrylonitrile 
Vistron v. OSHA 
6 O.S.C.H. 1483 (6th Cir. 1978) 
The ETS was contested and a request for stay of standard was 
denied. The petition for review was then withdrawn. 
Arsenic (Inorganic) 
ASARCO Inc. v. OSHA 
746 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984) 
The court of appeals affirmed the standard after OSHA 
developed a supplemental statement of · risk assessment to 
comply with the benzene decision, according to the court's 
earlier remand, 647 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1981). 
1 Adapted from John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic 
Substance Regulation: How Overregulation Causes 
Underregulation (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1988), pp. 
272-75, citing U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Preventing Injury and Illness in the Workplace, p. 365. 
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Asbestos ~j' 
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson 
499 F~2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
The court of appeals affirmed OSHA's 1972 asbestos standard. 
The court discussed the effects of OSHA's hybrid rulemaking 
procedure on the application of the substantial evidence· test. 
Asbestos Information Association/North.America v. OSHA 
727 F.2d 415 (5'tp Cir. 1984) 
The court of appeals vacated the ETS issued on November 4, 
1983 to lower exp6sure limit further than existing permanent 
standard. 
Benzene · 
• Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute 
.. 
448 U.S. 607, 100 s.ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980) 
reported below: American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA 
581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978) 
"The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to 
vacate the benzene standard but used different reasoning. 
Coke Oven Em~ssions 
' ( 
........ _---.... -- '.' 
American Iron and steel Institute v. OSHA 
577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978) 
The court· of appeals affirmed the major requirements of the 
coke .oven emissions standard. The Supreme Court agreed to 
review the decision, 448 u.s. 909, 1 o s.ct. 3054, 65 L.Ed.2d 
1139 (1980), but the request for re iew was withdrawn before 
the case could be heard, 448. U.S. 917, 101 s.ct. 38, 65~ 
\L.Ed.2d 1180 (1980). 
Cotton Dust 
American Textile Manufacturers Inatitute v. Donovan 
452 U.S. 490, 101 s.ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981) 
reported 1 below: AFL-CIO v. Marshall 
617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
Both the court of ap/eals and the Supreme Court upheld ,the 
major requirements of the cotton dust standard as applied to 
the textile industry. 
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Cotton Warehouse Association v. Marshall 
449 U.S. 809, 101 s.ct. 56, .66 L.Ed.2d 12 (1980) 
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals 
with respect t;o the warehousing and classing segments of the 
industry and remanded in light of the benzene decision. 
Texas Independent Ginners Association v. Marshall 
630 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980) 
The court of appeals vacated the cotton dust standard as 
applied to cotton ginning operations. 
Ethylene oxide 
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter 
702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
Public Citizen and organized labor requested a c·ourt order 
compelling OSHA to issue an ETS. The.c ~istrict court issued 
such an order, 554 F. Supp. 242 (D.c.o.c. 1983). On appeal, 
the court of appeals refused to order that an ETS be issued 
but did require OSHA to expedite its permanent rulemaking 
process. 
Formal~ehyde 
UAW v. Donovan 
590 F.Supp. 747 (D.C.D.C. 1984) 
The district court ordered OSHA to reconsider its refusal to 
issue an ETS for formaldehyde in light of new scientific 
evidence. The case was transferred to the court of appeals, 
756 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1985), in accordance with the decision 
in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Federal 
Communications Commission (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) . 2 The court of appeals upheld the district court's 
order. 
UAW v. Pendergrass 
878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
Organized labor sought preenforcement review of permanent 
formaldehyde standard. The court held that OSHA did not 
sufficiently explain its finding that formaldehyde presented 
2 TRAC holds that the court of appeals has ~xclusi ve 
. jurisdiction Jo hear all suits which might affect its future 
powers of review when a statute, such as the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, grants the coutt of appeals review of 
final agency action. 
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no significant carcinogenic risk to workers at e,xposure levels 
of 1 ppm or less. In addition, the court held that. evidence 
• • • 
• 
• • 
did not ·support OSHA' s refusal to authorize. medical . removal 
protection for workers disabled as a result of exposure to 
formaldehyde. The court remanded these two issues to OSHA and 
affirmed the other requirements of the standard. 
Fourteen carcinogens 
Dry Color Manufacturers' Association v. Department of Labor 
486 F.2d 98 (3rd Cir. 1973) 
The court of appeals vacated the ETS for DCB
3 and EI. 4 
Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association v • 
. Brennan ( SOCMA I) 
503 F. 2d 1155 (3rd Cir. 1974) 
The court of 
ethyleneimine. 
9 5 S • Ct . 13 9 6 , 
.. 
appeals affirmed _the~ permanent 
The Supreme Court denied review, 
43 L.Ed.2d 653 (1975). 
standard for 
420 U.S. 973, 
Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association v. 
Brennan (SOCMA II) 
506 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1974) 
The court. of appeals vacated the standard for MOCA. 
5 The 
Supreme Court denied review, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers 
International Union, AFL-CIO v. Dunlop, 423 U.S. 830, 96 s.ct. 
50, 46 L.Ed.2d 48 (1975), reh,den 423 u.s. 886, 96 s.ct. 163, 
46 L.Ed.2d 118 (1975). 
Hazard communication 
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Auchter (United 
Steelworkers I) y 
763 F.2d 728 (3rd Cir. 1985) 
The court .of appeals upheld the hazard communication standard 
for manufacturing but required OSHA to extend coverage" to 
nonmanufacturing sectors as well, unless the agency could 
demonstrate that the standard would not be feasible for those. 
sectors. 
3 3,3'-dichlorobenzedine. 
4 Ethyleneimine. 
', 
' 
5 
•,.4-methylene-bis{2-chloroaniline). 
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United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Pendergrass 
·(United Steelworkers II) 
819 F.2d 1263 (3rd Cir. 1987) 
Petitioners in this case sought enforcement of· previous 
decision, United Steelworkers I. The court of appeals agreed 
with petitioners that OSHA had unduly delayed the extension 
of coverage by requesting more comment. The court held that 
nonmanufacturing sectors had had adequate opportunity to 
respond ~uring the original rulemaking, which had no-t~- · 
specifie£·which sectors would be affected. 
Lead 
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall 
647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
The court of appeals affirmed the lead standard in part but 
directed OSHA to det·erinine the feasibility of engineering 
controls for thirty-eight industries and occupations. The 
Supreme Court denied review, Lead Industries Association, Inc. 
v. Donovan, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3148, 3149, 69 L.Ed.2d 997 
(1981). 
Pesticides 
Florida Peach Growers Association,-Inc. v. Department of Labor 
489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974) 
The court of appeals vacated the ETS for pesticides. 
Vinyl Chloride 
Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA 
509 F.2d 1301 (2nd Cir. 1975) 
The court of appeals affirmed the vinyl chloride standard. 
The Supreme Court denied review, Firestone Plastics Co. v. 
u.s. Department of Labor, 421 U.S. 992, 95 s.ct. 1998, 44 
L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). 
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